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Abstract
This study is about government expenditure in South Africa for
the 1960 - 1993 period. It seeks to investigate (i) the sources of
growth of government expenditure, (ii) the relative contribution of the
major functional categories (i.e. general administration, economIC
services, social services, and defence expenditure) to the aggregate
government expenditure, and (iii) to estimate the future growth in
government expenditure given the rate of growth of the economy.
The analytical approach adopted in the study is based on the
framework developed by Abedian and Standish (1984). In this
framework, the contribution of each expenditure category to total
expenditure is obtained as the ratio of the product of the percentage
change in an expenditure category and the share of that expenditure
category in the total to the percentage change in total expenditure. To
investigate the sources of the expenditure growth, a model relating
expenditure to its determinants is specified and estimated to obtain the
expenditure elasticities, which are then used to determine the impact of
the changes in each determinant on the expenditure in question.
Finally, using the rate of growth of domestic income (GDP), and the
long-run income elasticity of demand for government services, the
x
maXimum permissible growth of expenditure is determined. With
these estimates, the expected shortfall between the desired and actual
expenditure is then determined.
Our results show that the income elasticities of all the
functional expenditures and the total non-defence expenditure were
found to be greater than unity, suggesting the presence of the
Wagner's law in South Africa during the 1960 - 1993 period. This
implies that government expenditure increased more than the
proportionate increase in income.
Expenditure on administration was the largest contributor to the
level of government spending. However, in 1990, social services
became the largest contributor and remained at that high level until
1993.
The higher the growth in the economy, the larger will be
growth in government expenditure. A significantly high growth in the
economy was accompanied by a significantly high growth in
government expenditure. When the growth in the economy turned to





Since 1960, there has been a continuous increase in the role of the South
African government in economic activity, leading to a sharp increase in the share of
domestic resources used up by the public sector. Whether one looks at government
expenditure in levels or as a share of gross domestic expenditure the picture is the
same, that is, government spending has been increasing. In 1960, government
expenditure amounted to RO.6 billion. By 1993, the figure had increased to R133.2
billion. As a percentage of GDP, government expenditure increased from 12% in
1960 to 35 % in 1993, indicating that over a third of all domestic expenditure was
undertaken by the government in 1993 compared to just over one-tenth in 1960
(Central Statistical Services of South Africa, 1960; 1994).
A major factor behind the growth of government spending during the 1960-
1993 period has been the increased sophistication of the economy. According to
Meyer (1985), the more sophisticated an economy becomes, the greater the demand
for public sector goods and services. As governments respond to the increased
demand for public goods and services, their expenditures increase correspondingly.
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The increased demand for public goods and services arises for several reasons. First,
once the basic necessities of life have been met, the community may show an
increasing preference for more state protection, health services, education, pensions,
cultural facilities, etc. as wealth increases. Second, technological advancement that
accompanies economic development leads to a more rapid growth in efficiency and
productivity in the private sector (particularly in primary and secondary production)
than in the public sector, leading to a relatively greater increase in expenditure by the
public sector than by the private sector (Browne, 1975).
Until 1975, the fiscal budget of South Africa had consisted of two separate
accounts, the Revenue Account and the Loan Account. The idea behind separating
these two accounts was that, current expenditures were to be financed from current
revenue and capital expenditure from borrowing. Although this distinction was
abolished in 1976 and a single State Revenue account was established, there was still a
strong feeling in the public sector that current expenditure should be financed from
current revenue and capital expenditure from borrowing. This principle was strictly
adhered to until 1981 when the government started financing some current expenditure
from borrowing (Black and Dollery, 1989).
Government expenditure policy from the late 1960s to the mid-1970s was
influenced largely by the publications of two official reports. First, was the 1964
Schumann Commission of Enquiry Report on the "Financial Relations between the
Central Government and the Provinces". Although the recommendations contained in
the Report were not implemented fully by the government it set the basis upon which
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a government white paper setting out the needs of the provinces was written. This
government white paper set out the: (a) various services or functions that the
provinces had to provide; (b) the extent of the central government's funding of the
provinces, given the different sources from which the provinces' incomes are derived;
and (c) the provincial deficit, which forms the basis of the subsidy from the central
government. Second, was the Franzsen Commission Reports on the "Fiscal and
Monetary Policy in South Africa". Three reports were submitted by the Commission
and published in 1969 and 1970. Many of the recommendations contained in the
Franzsen Reports were accepted and implemented by the government. Four main
recommendations were made on the expenditure side of the government [mances.
These include: (i) the institution of Cabinet Finance Committee to control public
spending; (ii) planning of public expenditures five years in advance; (iii)
introduction of a system of programme budgeting; and (iv) abolition of the distinction
between the Revenue and Loan Accounts.
The most significant aspect of public expenditure in the 1980s was the
tendency on the part of fiscal authorities to exceed budget estimates. Actual
expenditures consistently exceeded budgeted amounts in each fiscal year of 1981/82
to 1986/87, and in some years by as much as 5.6 % (Calitz, 1988). Although fiscal
discipline was preached in all the budgets, it was never practised. There was also a
tendency to finance current expenditure out of loans (a practise unknown in the 1960s
and 1970s) because the government current revenues had began to fall short of current
expenditures.
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Another interesting aspect of the government spending during the 1980s was
that more money was spent on consumption than on investment, with a significant
portion of the increases in consumption spending consisting of increases in the wages
and salaries of public sector employees and increased interest payments on public debt
(Black and Dollery 1989).
Increases in government spending are not a new phenomenon in South Africa.
However, the size and the rate of growth of the government spending in recent years
and the accompanied fiscal deficits have raised serious concern to many in the
country. An analysis of these expenditures, detailing out the sources of growth and
the speed with which the government adjusts its expenditure patterns in response to the
increases in demand for public goods and services will provide an invaluable support
to the policy makers in their attempt to restructure the expenditures of the public
sector.
1.2 Objectives
This study is about government expenditure in South Africa during the 1960-
1993 period. The specific objectives are to:
(i) evaluate the relative contribution of each of the functional expenditures to the total
government expenditure;
(ii) to investigate the sources of growth of the government expenditure; and
(iii) to estimate the future growth in the government expenditure, given some idea of
the rate of growth of gross domestic product (GDP).
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1.3 Methodology
The analytical approach adopted in this study is based on the framework
developed by Abedian and Standish (1984). In this framework, total government
expenditure is divided into four main functional categories, namely, general
administration, economic services, social services, and defence. The contribution of
each expenditure category to total expenditure is obtained by the use of an equation
that relates the product of the percentage change in an expenditure category and the
share of that expenditure category in total expenditure over a given period to the
percentage change in total expenditure in the same period. To investigate the sources
of the expenditure growth, a model relating expenditure to its determinants is specified
and estimated to obtain the expenditure elasticities. The elasticities are then used to
determine the impact and significance of the changes in the determinants on the
changes in expenditure. Finally, using the rate of growth of the expenditure, rate of
growth of domestic income, and the long-run income elasticity of demand for
government services, the maximum permissible growth of each expenditure category
is determined. With these estimates the expected shortfall between the desired and
actual expenditure is then analysed.
1.4 Organisation of the Thesis
The study is organised into six chapters. Following the introduction in chapter
5
one, chapter two examines the theoretical aspects of government expenditure growth.
Chapter three investigates the historical trends in government expenditure in South
Africa, while chapter four discusses the specification of the government expenditure
model for the empirical analysis. Chapter five presents the results of the estimated
expenditure equations, their interpretations, and discussions on them. Chapter six
finally concludes the study with some policy recommendations.
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Chapter Two
Theoretical Aspects of Public Expenditure Growth
2.1 The Nature of Public Expenditure
Public expenditure reflects the policy choices of governments. Governments
decide which goods and services to provide and the quantity and quality in which they
will be produced. Public expenditure then represents the costs of carrying out these
policies. This definition allows one to make two distinctions. First, there are the
costs of supplying goods and services through the public sector budget. This is the
direct spending by the government. Second, there are the private sector costs that
come about as a result of some government rules and regulations. For example, the
passing of a law requiring mining companies to install certain minimum safety
measures will result in the mining companies incurring some expenditure to comply
with the law. This is the indirect spending by the government (Brown and Jackson,
1990).
Public expenditure can also be classified into two broad categories. The fITst
category consists of purchases of current goods, services, and capital goods. This is
often referred to as exhaustive public expenditures. Exhaustive public expenditures
are, thus, purchases of inputs by the public sector. They are the claims by the public
sector on the resources of the economy. The second category of public expenditure
consists of transfers. Transfers include expenditures on pensions, subsidies, interest
costs on public debt, and unemployment benefits. Transfer payments do not represent
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claims on the society's resources by the public sector. Instead, transfers are a form
of redistribution of resources between individuals in society, with the resources
flowing through the public sector as an intermediary (Brown and Jackson, 1990).
2.2 Models of Public Expenditure Growth
Various theories have been put forward to explain the growth in public
expenditure over time. These theories can broadly be grouped into three. These are
the development theories, demand-side theories, and the supply-side theories. In what
follows, we review each one of these theories.
(a) Development models
The development models of public expenditure growth are based on the works
of Musgrave (1969; 1974) and Rostow (1971). According to these models, in the early
stages of economic growth and development, public sector investment as a proportion
of total domestic investment is found to be high. The public sector is seen to provide
the social and economic infrastructures, such as roads, transportation systems, power
installations, sanitation systems, law and order, health and education, and investment
In human capital. These infrastructural overheads are necessary to propel the
economy for take-off into the maturity stage of development. Since many of the items
of the infrastructural overheads have large external benefits, or require large capital
outlays, with the returns spread over a longer period of time, they do not lend
themselves readily to private provision. Hence, in the early stages of economic
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development the public sector's share in the provision of capital goods are relatively
large. In the maturity stage, the public sector continues to supply investment goods,
which, at this stage, are complementary to private investment. But once the economy
reaches the maturity stage, the mix of public expenditures will shift from expenditures
on infrastructure to increasing expenditure on education, health and welfare services.
In the stage of high mass consumption, spending on income maintenance programmes
and programmes designed to redistribute welfare will grow significantly relative to
other items of public expenditure and also relative to GNP. The increase in transfer
expenditure at this stage, however, depends on whether the income inequality
decreases or increases as per capita income rises.
Two additional factors that Musgrave (1984) argues could lead to public
expenditure growth are technological and demographic changes. According to him,
technological change may increase or decrease the relative importance of goods whose
benefits are largely external, and which must therefore be provided by the
government. For example, changes in weapons technology that lead to an equipment-
intensive military may increase public expenditure. Demographic changes, such as
changes in the rate of population growth, or age distribution, may be reflected in the
changes in expenditures on education, health, and welfare services. In addition, high
population mobility would lead to the growth of new cities and urbanisation, resulting
in increased demands for municipal facilities and other public services.
The development models of public expenditure growth have been subjected to
a number of criticisms. The critics, generally, see these models as nothing more than
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sweeping approaches to the development process. According to them, the
development models are generalizations gleaned from the examination of a large
number of different case histories of developing countries (see Browne and Jackson,
1990).
(b) Demand-side models
The most frequently cited of the demand side models of public expenditure
growth is the "Wagner's law". The Wagner's law states that: "as per capita income
of a country rises, the public sector will grow in relative importance" (Wagner, 1877).
That is, as income rises, the demand for goods and services supplied by the
government increases more than in proportion, mainly because of the technological
requirements of industrialization and urbanization that accompany the income growth
(Tridimas, 1985; Lindauer and Velenchik, 1992). This argument is more appealing
for merit goods than for transfers, therefore the law is interpreted in terms of the size
of the income elasticity for public goods.
Wagner offers three justifications for the growth of the public sector as income
increases. First, there are certain needs, such as administration, protection, law and
order, education, redistribution of income, and capital expenditure that accompany the
process of industrialization and which must be provided for by the government.
Second, a considerable expansion of cultural and welfare expenditures, especially with
respect to education and the redistribution of income, takes place as income expands.
Education and culture are areas where public production are more efficient than
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private ones. Hence, the public sector would grow as these basic needs are satisfied
and the consumption pattern shifts in this direction (Tarschys, 1975). Wagner argues
that these (cultural and welfare) expenditures are expenditures on superior goods or
luxuries. As such, the income elasticity of demand for them will be greater than
unity. Thus, more of them will be demanded as incomes rise. Finally, Wagner
argues that the inevitable changes in technology and the increasing scale of investment
required in many activities in an industrializing country would create an increasing
number of private monopolies. The effect of the actions of these monopolies will
eventually have to be offset, or the monopolies themselves taken over by the state in
the interest of economic efficiency. In addition, some projects, such as railroad
network, are so large in scale that only the state can afford to provide them.
Increases in expenditure on such overhead capital and on public services required to
meet the personnel needs of such investments may exceed the growth of income,
making the income elasticity of public spending to exceed unity.
Even though Wagner's law may help illuminate some aspects of past reality,
the law cannot predict what will happen in the future because it lacks in predictive
powers. Furthermore, Wagner's law sees increases in expenditure as a function of
certain needs or requirements such as technological changes and monopolization.
Such a theory however, is not capable of explaining marked temporal and spatial
differences in the character of expenditure development that do not fit the
preconceived scheme.
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Bird (1971), identifies three conditions under which one may expect the
Wagner's law to operate. First, is a situation where per capita income is rising.
Second, where there are technological and institutional changes of a particular sort.
Third, where there is democratization of the polity, in the sense of wider political
participation. These three conditions suggest that Wagner's law is explicitly framed to
refer only to countries in which income rises as a result of industrialization.
According to Peacock and Wiseman (1961), the neglect of the effect of social
upheavals in the Wagner's law is a serious shortcoming. To them war, for example,
is one of the greatest facts of life in the twentieth century, so any theory of public
sector growth that ignores wars and their associated expenditures leaves out a very
important factor.
According to Seeber and Dockel (1978), the law is based on Wagner's
normative assumptions about the nature of the state and its behaviour. The hypothesis,
therefore, represents an opinion on what ought to happen as an economy becomes
industrialized. Further, the empirical content of the law is also doubtful since it is not
clear that the role of the state should necessarily increase through its takeover of
private monopolies if they exist, nor is it clear that certain goods and services
provided by the government are luxuries.
(c) Supply-side models
Among the supply-side theories of public expenditure growth are the
Niskanen's bureaucratic hypotheses, Baumols' differential productivity model, and
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Peacock and Wiseman's hypothesis.
(i) The bureaucratic hypothesis
The bureaucratic hypothesis of public expenditure growth is based on the
writings of Niskanen (1968; 1971). Niskanen postulates that bureaucrats seek to
maximize the size of their bureaux, i.e. they act as utility maximizers. Employing a
managerial utility function approach, Niskanen explains that the factors in a
bureaucrat's utility function include his salary, the size of the staff working under him
and their salaries, his public reputation, his customary extra privileges, power, and
status. Since many of these factors are directly related to the size of the budget, it
follows that bureaucrats who are utility maximizers are also budget maximizers.
Bohm (1987) has criticised Niskanen's approach on the ground that not all
areas of economic policy are readily adaptable to the self interested behaviour of
bureaucrats. Furthermore, it is not all the bureaucrats that behave in the manner that
Niskanen postulates in his hypothesis. According to Cullis and Iones (1992), the
bureaucratic hypothesis is rather long on theory than on empirical evidence, although
they agree that empirical evidence is not easy to discern. They argue that there are as
many good and bad bureaucrats as there are doctors, scientists, etc. Also that there is
the question of the media, which in democracies, have more powers and therefore may
act as strong watchdogs on bureaux that are blatantly inefficient.
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(ii) Baumol's differential productivity model
In his model, Baumol (1967) divides the economy into two sectors, which he
labels as progressive and non-progressive sectors. The progressive sector is
characterized by cumulative increases in productivity per man-hour, arising from
economies of scale and technological change. In the non-progressive sector, labour
productivity advances at a slower rate than that experienced in the progressive sector.
In the progressive sector labour is primarily an instrument, an incidental requisite for
the attainment of final product, whereas in the non-progressive sector labour is an end
product itself. This means that in the progressive sector, capital can be substituted for
labour without affecting the nature of the product. In the non-progressive sector,
however, since labour services are themselves part of the product that is being
consumed, a reduction of the labour content will change the product that is being
produced. If improvements in labour productivity are matched by equal increases in
the hourly wage rates, then unit costs in the progressive sector will remain constant
overtime. To prevent labour moving from the non-progressive to the progressive
sector in search of higher hourly wage rates, the non-progressive sector would have to
match the hourly wage rate increases obtained in the progressive sector. Since
productivity increases in the non-progressive sector is less than that in the progressive
sector, unit costs in the non-progressive sector will rise. This means that in the next
period the opportunity cost of the non-progressive sector I s output relative to that in the
progressive sector will increase.
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Baumol's model provides a possible explanation of public expenditure growth.
If the public sector is one in which productivity increases are less than those in other
sectors of the economy, and if wages of public sector employees move in line with
wages in other sectors of the economy, then ceteris paribus, public expenditure will
nse. In other words, it will cost the public sector more just to stand still.
A number of observations follow from Baumol's model. First, if the ratio of
public sector output to private sector output is to remain constant then labour
resources must be transferred from the private to the public sector. Second, it follows
that public sector exhaustive expenditure of which a large portion is spent on wages
and salaries will rise faster than private sector expenditure (Brown and Jackson 1990).
(Hi) Peacock and Wiseman's displacement hypothesis
Another supply-oriented approach to government expenditure growth IS
provided by the Peacock and Wiseman hypothesis.
Peacock and Wiseman examine the possibility that there are permanent
influences affecting government expenditure at all times and in all societies. These
permanent influences, they argue, may generate public expenditure growth ill
developing societies irrespective of their political and social characteristics.
To provide an explanation of the time pattern of growth in government
expenditure, Peacock and Wiseman begin with the concept of the nature and
behaviour of governments. They see taxation as setting a constraint on government
expenditures. As the economy and thus incomes grow tax revenue (at constant tax
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rates) rises, thereby enabling public expenditure to grow in line with gross national
product (GNP). In normal times public expenditure shows a gradual upward trend.
During periods of social upheaval, this gradual upward trend in public expenditure is
disturbed. The periods of social upheaval coincide with war, famine, or some large-
scale social disaster, which requires a rapid increase in public expenditure. In order to
finance the increase in public expenditures the government would be forced to raise
taxation levels. The rise in taxation levels will be acceptable to the electorate during
periods of crisis, thereby permitting public expenditure to be displaced upwards.
This is what Peacock and Wiseman refer to as the "displacement effect", a process
reflecting an upward shift in the trend line of public expenditure. Following the
period of the crisis, however, public expenditure does not fall back to its original
level. In particular, the social disturbances might have imposed new and continuing
obligations upon the government. Thus the government may be obliged by the effects
of the disturbance to assume new functions, making it difficult to concentrate on the
previous functions only. Changes in social and political ideas and institutions as such
may condition the evolution of the functions of government, and may also affect the
nature and significance of public expenditure on such social upheavals.
Another effect that Peacock and Wiseman thought may affect the level of
government spending is the "inspection effect". This arises from the voters' keener
awareness of social problems during periods of upheaval. The government, therefore,
expands its scope of services to address these social problems, and because the
electorates' perception of tolerable levels of taxation does not return to its former level
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the government is able to finance these higher levels of expenditure originating in the
expanded scope of government and debt charges.
Cullis and Jones (1992) have questioned Peacock and Wiseman's argument
that after social upheavals government expenditures will remain at higher levels than
the pre-upheavallevels. Brown and Jackson (1990), show that there are at least three
possibilities. To them, public expenditures in the post war period can return to their
original growth path, or there can be an increase in post war public spending, or the
trend experienced during the war can continue into the post war period. According to
Tarschys (1975), Peacock and Wiseman's hypothesis belongs to the ideological
cognitive level of explanation of public expenditure growth!. Peltzman (1980) sees
Peacock and Wiseman I s explanation as nothing more than a historical mode of
analysis, i.e. specific historical events are seen as the primary causes of the growth of
government.
2.3 Evaluation of Expenditure Growth Models
The discussion above has shown that different models exist, each tending to
emphasise different factors as causing growth in public spending. Factors such as the
specific needs of the citizens of a country as determined by cultural, ethnic, religious,
and socio-economic behaviours; the stage of the country's development; the political
process as well as budgetary procedures; and the efficiency of the public sector in
1 The ideological-cognitive level focus on changes in
knowledge, beliefs, and desires shifts in the consumer
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providing services, are emphasised. In reality, however, the observed pattern of
government expenditure behaviour is a result of a systematic interaction of mutually
interdependent economic, social, cultural and political factors.
An early attempt at providing an integrated approach to the understanding of
the relationship between the different influences was provided by Breton (1974), who
put forward a highly generalised single equation model of public expenditure growth.
In this model, Breton argues that the factors that influence public expenditure growth
include aggregate income; tax prices of alternative government policies; relative
bargaining power of politicians and bureaucrats; costs of political participation relative
to the disutility of imposed government policies; degree to which individuals
remember when the government ignored their preferences; and the opposition to
government policies.
Breton's model encompasses many of the elements of the public choice theory.
Unfortunately, however, most of his variables cannot be measured quantitatively.
Even if they could be measured, a number of complex interactions between them
would require the model to be modified extensively to enhance its empirical
application.
Jackson (1973), set out an integrative micro-economic model of public
expenditure growth, which was later expanded upon by Brown and Jackson (1990).
First, the model sets out the forces that generate demand for publicly provided goods
and services. Second, the model examines the influences on the supply of public
demand is a case in point
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services. The interaction of the demand for and supply of public services determines
the levels of publicly provided services, via the public budget.
In the model, the growth of public expenditure can be explained in terms of a
number of factors. These include:
(i) changes in the demand for public goods and services, which itself is influenced
amongst others by relative prices of private sector goods, incomes, tax rates, and
population changes;
(ii) changes in the set of production activities and/or mix of inputs used in the
production process. These inputs may include the nature of the service
environment and population changes;
(iii) changes in the quality of public sector output; and
(iv) changes in input prices.
A major drawback of Brown and Jackson's model is that, while it illustrates
the complexities of the public expenditure process, it is predominantly demand-driven.
Brown and Jackson, however, explain that it is possible to widen the scope of the
model to incorporate some of the supply-side determinants.
2.4 Empirical Evidence
(a) Developed Countries
According to Bird (1971), the experiences of countries such as Canada (1933-
1965), Germany (1872-1958), Sweden (1913-1958), Japan (1890-1960), Norway and
the United States of America, show that the Wagner's law holds in aggregate terms.
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Further, he observed that the most rapid expenditure increases have generally been in
the social services. On the other hand, studies by Musgrave (1969), Wagner and
Weber (1977), Mann (1980), and Ram (1987), do not confirm the Wagner's law.
Gandhi (1971) postulates that, it is the imprecision of the law that renders its empirical
applications difficult. He points out that the imprecision of the law has led to the
arrival of five different conclusions, using the hypothesis in cross-sectional studies.
First, that the elasticity of public expenditure with respect to GNP is greater than
unity. Second, that the elasticity of government consumption expenditure with respect
to national income is greater than unity. Third, the elasticity of public expenditures
with respect to GNP per capita is greater than unity. Fourth, the elasticity of public
expenditure as a share of GNP with respect to GNP per capita is more than unity.
Finally, the elasticity of public expenditure per capita is greater than unity.
Goode (1984) reviews the results of studies conducted on thirteen industrial
countries over the period 1950-1977. He found that the income elasticities of
government expenditures (measured as the percent increase in government
expenditures divided by the percent increase in GDP, both in constant prices) range
between 1.4 and 2.7.
Ram (1986) examines the relationship between growth in per capita income
and growth in government spending. He used real government consumption as a
measure of government size. He finds that there is a positive relationship between
growth in government and overall economic growth. He concludes that both the
externality (i.e. direct government spending such as expenditure on education and
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infrastructure, and private sector expenditure that come about as a result of meeting
government regulations) and differential productivity effects (i.e. the relative
productivity of factors employed in the public as opposed to the private sector) are
positive, so productivity in the government sector appears to be higher than in the
private sector, at least in his 1960s sub-sample.
In his work on American government activity in the first half of the twentieth
century, Fabricant (1952), mapped interstate differences in public expenditures. He
found that the government's expansion was a concomitant of economic growth, and
that most variance between states could be explained by variations in income,
urbanisation, and population density. Income was by far the most important variable
in his study, although urbanisation gave a better explanation of expenditure surge in
such areas as fire protection, sanitation, and social welfare. Brazer (1959) made a
similar comparison of United States city expenditures and found density, median
family income, and intergovernmental revenue to be the most important explanatory
variables.
(b) Developing Countries
The causal relationship between income level and government expenditure is
not so clear in developing countries. A study by Lall (1969) covering forty six
developing nations found no significant relationship between GNP per capita and total
government expenditures on several functional sub-categories of government
expenditures. Enweze (1973) found that thirteen out of fifteen developing countries in
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his research had positive income elasticities for most of the principal functional
categories and for total expenditure.
Goffman and Mahar (1971) examine the public expenditure behaviour of
several smaller Caribbean nations: Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica,
Panama, Hondoras, and Guyana. The primary purpose of the study was to identify
and isolate the basic factors that have influenced the level of aggregate public spending
in these nations. The study also seeked to measure the effects upon absolute
expenditure growth of factors such as income, prices, and population. Their results
show that over-time, the data supports the Wagner's law. That is, as per capita
income in a country increases, government spending as a proportion of aggregate
output also increases, i.e., the income elasticity of public spending tended to exceed
unity. Findings for the Dominican Republic indicate that, on average, a 1% increase
in income was accompanied by a 4% increase in government expenditure. On the
other hand, a 1% increase in income in Panama showed a less than 1% expenditure
increase, and in the former British Guiana expenditures, on average, declined as
income rose. Based on these findings Goffman and Mahar concluded that since the
variations in income within and among the nations are so great, it is doubtful whether
the data support an oversimplified Wagner-type income-expenditure relationship.
Frederick Pryor conducted a study in 1968 that compared the development of
public expenditure in a sample of market economies in centralised economies. The
economic system variable was found to have played a significant role in accounting for
variations in expenditures on education, research, non-military external security, and
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possibly internal security, but not for defence, health, and welfare. Spending on
internal security, foreign aid, and research and development appeared to be related to
per capita income, but not spending on military purposes, education, and health (Pryor
1968).
A study by Tait and HelIer (1982) covering central government expenditure of
ninety countries, including nearly all the industrial countries and a large number of
less developed countries, related expenditure in functional and economic categories to
variables thought likely to influence them. Their study was successful in explaining
the expenditure ratio for social security and welfare. Their results show that per
capita income, percentage of the population over the age of 65, and the share of the
labour force employed in industry, were all positive and statistically significant. Their
health expenditure ratio was related positively to the percentage of the population over
the age of 65 and negatively to the population per hospital bed, suggesting that
countries with few hospital beds in relation to their population avoid spending for
hospitals and do not substitute other health expenditures. The ratio of educational
expenditure to GDP was less well-planned. For low income countries, this variable
was associated strongly and positively with per capita income and also with the
enrolment ratio in secondary schools. The percentage of population under the age of
15 had no significant influence on the ratio. Expenditure on roads and other forms of
transportation and on communications were found to be positively related to the rate
of growth of the urban population and negatively related to both the share of
manufacturing and the share of agriculture in GDP. The expenditure ratio for housing
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and community amenities was positively related to per capita income in low-income
countries but not in high-income countries. The ratio of government wage and salary
payments to GDP was positively related to the educational expenditure ratio, reflecting
the importance of teachers' salaries. Spending on economic services in the fields of
mining and manufacturing was also associated with relatively high expenditure for
wages and salaries.
Landau's (1986) study on sixty five countries relates growth in per capita
income to several sets of independent variables. These include measures of
international economic conditions, human and physical capital, structure of
production, historical and political factors, resources, population, geoclimatic factors,
and three-year lagged averages of the share of government spending in GDP,
(disaggregated into education, defence and transfer payments, other government
consumption, and government investment). He also includes measures of government
revenue and proxies for the level of regulation. He fmds that general government
consumption has a negative and significant influence on growth, whereas the influence
of spending on education is positive but insignificant. He also finds that the influence
of military expenditure (net of the effect of taxation to finance it), is essentially zero,
as is the effect of transfers.
(c) South Africa
The sources of growth in government expenditure have also been investigated
for South Africa. Seeber and Dockel (1978) did a study of the functional classification
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of government expenditure in South Africa for the 1948 - 1975 period. They
estimated the relationship between government expenditure and several explanatory
variables in a single equation model. Their results showed that the income and past
expenditure variables, were the major determinants of the functional expenditure
categories. The displacement effect variable was used in the model to test the degree
of substitution that occurred between the different expenditure categories. No
significant displacement effect was observed as was indicated by the positive
coefficients attached to the displacement variable. All the government expenditure
categories increased about simultaneously. The Wagner law was partially confmned
by the results, which showed income elasticities of greater than unity. High income
elasticities were found, the most important being for central government (excluding
defence and local authorities). On the basis of their results, it could be said that
government expenditure can be expected to increase at a rate greater that the growth in
income in South Africa.
Abedian and Standish (1984), examined the supply-side of government output
as viewed through total government expenditure in South Africa for the period
covering 1920 to 1982. They divided government expenditure into their functional
categories. For the entire 1920-1982 period, their estimated income elasticities were
significantly different from unity, supporting the Wagner's law. However, their
estimates for the 1948-1982 sub-period were not significantly different from the
critical value of unity, suggesting a rejection of Wagner's law during this period.
Also, during the 1948-1982 period, the speed of adjustment was unusually low, which
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seems to explain the low income elasticity of government expenditure they obtained.
The low speed of adjustment also implied a growing gap between actual and desired
level of government spending. The income elasticity for public goods was also found
to be inelastic in the short-run but elastic in the long-run.
2.5 Summary
The causes of the growth in government spending have been attributed to
several factors, ranging from the development process to demand and supply
influences. Development theorists see the growth in government spending as an
inevitable consequence of economic growth. They argue that as the economy goes
through its development stages, the government would be required to provide the
supporting infrastructural facilities which tend to expand its size. The demand-side
advocates base their argument on the relationship between incomes and the level of
government spending. To them, as incomes increase, so will government
expenditure, causing the income elasticity of government expenditure to be above
unity. The supply-side supporters see growth in government spending in terms of the
government's response to the increases in demand for its goods and services.
Empirical studies on the growth in government expenditure have not produced
conclusive results. The result depends on the degree of sophistication of the economy,
including the degree of urbanisation, demographic changes, economic growth and
micro-economic factors, such as the relative prices of private sector goods and
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services, the quality of the public goods and services, and mix of production inputs.
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Chapter Three
Trends in General Government Expenditure
3.1 Aggregate Government Expenditure
In nominal terms, general government expenditure has been increasing since
1960. Table 1 shows that, government expenditure averaged some R727.1 million in
the 1960-64 period. The expenditure increased to an annual average of R1443.44
million in 1965-69, representing an increase of some 98.5%. The upward surge in the
expenditure continued throughout the rest of the review period. As the entries in Table
1 indicate, in each period after 1965-69, the increases in the expenditure was over
100%, with increases of over 150% recorded in the 1975-79 and 1985-89 periods.
Generally, the expenditure increases was higher in the 1985-89 period, during which
time some R46625 million was spend in each year of the period.
Table 1 and Figure 1 show that as percentage of GDP, total general
government expenditure showed a general trend increase during the review period.
The entries in Table 1 indicate that general government expenditure averaged some
12.7% in each year of the 1960-64 period. The share increased to 15.4% in the 1965-
69 period and then to 20.4% in the 1970-74 period. The expenditure-GDP ratio
increased by some 4.6 percentage points to 25% in the 1975-79 period, but fell by
some 3.5 percentage points to 21.5% in the 1980-84 period. Thereafter, the share of
the expenditure in GDP increased sharply, reaching some 32 % in the 1990-93 period.
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Table 1. General Government Expenditure, 1960 - 1993
(period average)
Year in million rands
as %GDP % changes
1960-64 727.1 12.72 -
1965-69 1443.44 115.40 98.5
1970-74 3408.54 20.38 136.1
1975-79 8531.58 25.00 150.3
1980-84 17482.52 21.50 104.9
1985-89 46625.98 25.86 166.7
1990-93 104169.73 31.95 123.4
SOURCE: APPEND IX 1
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The increase in government spending to GDP ratio was a result of a
combination of factors. Partly, for political reasons the government found it difficult
to resist demands for increases in public expenditure. Most components of public
spending have increased their share in GDP. The rising government spending to GDP
ratio also reflected the lack of significant economic growth.
3.2 Functional Composition
The distribution of the total government spending into the major functional
categories of general administration, economic services, social services, and defence is
presented in Table 2.
(a) General Administration
Table 2 shows that, the largest portion of the general government expenditure
was attributed to spending on general administration, which experienced a trend
increase throughout the period under review. Government expenditure on general
administration amounted to R335. 9 million on average in each year of the 1960-64
period. The figure increased to R727.44 million in 1965-69, representing an increase
of some 116.6%. The expenditure nearly tripled to an annual average of R2120.78
million during 1970-74. The trend increase in the spending on general administration
continued until the 1990-93 period. The expenditure amounted to an annual average of
R4925.9 million in 1975-79 and RI0240.4 million in 1980-84, indicating an increase
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of 107.9 %. The annual average expenditure levels in the 1985-89 and 1990-93 periods
were R26811.3 million and R36716.4 million, respectively. The 1990-93 figure
represents an increase of some 36.9%, compared with the 107.9% increase recorded
in the 1980-84 period.
Table 2. Functional Composition of Government Expenditure,
(average for period)
Function /
Period 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-93
in million rands
General
Administration 335.86 727.44 2120.78 4925.86 10240.42 26811.32 36716.45
Economic
Services 91.90 211.90 580.24 1469.92 2407.54 4597.14 14660.25
Social
Services 220.08 292.22 386.10 847.06 2014.58 8292.46 41988.93
Defence 79.26 211.88 321.42 1288.74 2819.98 6925.06 10804.10
Total 727.1 1443.44 3408.54 8531.58 17482.52 46625.98 104169.73
As % of total government expenditure
General
Administration 46.42 48.84 61.38 57.72 56.50 57.90 34.53
Economic
Services 12.82 14.10 17.1 17.34 13.64 9.24 13.50
Social
Services 30.76 21.86 11.64 10.12 11.10 16.52 37.95
Defence 10.46 15.62 9.56 14.88 15.94 14.40 10.15
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
As % of gross domestic product
General
Administration 5.78 7.64 12.52 14.26 12.36 15.24 11.15
Economic
Services 1.70 2.34 3.54 4.42 3.04 2.66 4.60
Social
Services 3.80 3.14 2.28 2.44 2.56 4.02 12.80
Defence 1.44 2.28 2.04 3.88 3.54 3.94 3.40
Total 12.72 15.40 20.38 25.00 21.50 25.86 31.95
SOURCE. Appendlces 1 to 5
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The significant increase in government spending in general administration in
the mid- to the late 1970s and early 1980s coincided with the creation of the homeland
system and self-governing territories. The number of government employees
increased and the cost of administrating the country increased. In the early 1990s,
there was a reprioritisation in government spending shifting resources towards social
services. This resulted in a decline in expenditure on administration.
Table 2 shows that the share of spending on general administration in total
general government expenditure averaged 46.4 % in 1960-64 and 48.8 % in 1965-69,
indicating an increase of some 2.4 percentage points. The share, however, jumped to
an average of 61.4% in the 1970-74 period, representing an increase of some 12.6
percentage points, compared with the 2.4 percentage points increase recorded in the
1965-69 period. The share of expenditure on general administration, however, fell to
57.7% in the 1975-79, and stabilised around this figure for the rest of the period under
revIew.
As a percentage of GDP, Table 2 and Figure 2 show that expenditure on
general administration showed a general trend increase during the period under
review, except for the sharp drop in 1990. The expenditure averaged 5.8% in each
year of the 1960-64 period and 7.6% in the 1965-69 period, indicating an increase of
some 1.9 percentage point between the two periods. The share of the expenditure in
GDP, however, jumped by nearly five percentage points to 12.5% in 1970-74 and
increased again by 1.8 percentage points to 14.3% in 1975-79. Thereafter, the share
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dropped to 12.4% in 1985-89 period but increased sharply to 15.2% In 1985-89
before falling again to 11.2% in the 1990-93 period.
Figure 2: Expenditure on General Administration as
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The entries in Table 2 shows that expenditure on economic services was the
third largest expenditure category in the 1960s, following general administration and
social services. Expenditure on economic services moved to the second position in the
1970s, after overtaking social services, but moved back to the third position in the
early 1980s, following the surge in defence spending. In the early 1990s, expenditure
on economic services slipped further to the fourth position. The expenditure increased
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by 130.6% from an annual average of R91.90 million in the 1960-64 period to
R211.9 million in the 1965-69 period. Thereafter, the expenditure experienced a sharp
trend increase, reaching an annual average of R1469.9 million in the 1975-79 period.
The expenditure increased by 63.8 % to R2407.5 million in 1980-85, followed by a
further increase of 90.9% to an annual average of R4597.1 million in the 1985-89
period. Expenditure on economic services amounted to R14660.25 million in each
year of 1990-1993, representing a huge increase of 218.9 % over the 1985-89 figure.
The investments in the economic sector by the government in the 1970s and
throughout the 1980s. Investments in industries such as ESKOM, SASOL,
ARMSCOR, ISCOR, the Railways and Harbours and other infrastructure were seen as
important due to the increasing isolation of South Africa by outside countries.
As a percentage of total government spending, Table 2 shows that expenditure
on economic services experienced a trend increase throughout the 1960s and 1970s
and a trend decrease in the 1980s and early 1990s. The share increased steadily from
an annual average of 12.8% in the 1960-64 to 17.3% in the 1975-79 period.
Thereafter, the share declined steadily to 13.5 % in 1990-93, except for the steep drop
to 9.2% in the 1985-89 period.
As percentage of GDP, Table 2 and Figure 3 show that spending on economic
services, like the share of economic services in total government expenditure, showed
a general trend increase in the 1960s and 1970s, a trend decrease in the 1980s, and an
increase in the early 1990s. The share increased steadily from an annual average of
1.7% in 1960-64 to 4.4% in 1975-79. Thereafter, the share declined sharply by some
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1.7 percentage points to an average of 2.7% in 1985-89 before increasing by 1.9
percentage points to an average of 4.6 % in the each year of the 1990-93.
Figure 3: Expenditure on Econom ic Services as % of
Gross Domestic Product
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From the functional perspective, expenditure on social services by the
general government was the second largest expenditure item in the 1960s, third in the
early 1970s, and fourth in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Expenditure on social
services moved to the second position as the largest expenditure item, following
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spending on general administration, in the late 1980s and early 1990s as the
government began to address the issue of backlogs in social services and facilities
(Table 2). Table 2 shows that in nominal terms, government spending on social
services averaged R220.1 million per annum in the 1960-1964 period, R292.2 million
in 1965-69, and R386.11 million in 1970-74. In the 1975-79 period, social services
expenditure jumped to an annual average of R847.06 million, representing an increase
of 119.4% over the previous period's figure. Thereafter, spending on social services
increased sharply, reaching R41988.9 million in each year of the 1990-93 period.
Expenditure on social services increased as a result of increases in the
allocations for education, health and non-contributory cash payments to the target
population. These include the old age pensions, the disability grants, war veterans
grants, child and parent grants, foster care grants, and care dependency grants. Most
of these grants were only accessible to certain population groups. In the late 1980s
and early 1990s, there was an increased access to the grants and the government was
closing the gap in the amounts of the grants received by the different race groups.
As a percentage of total government spending, Table 2 shows that social
expenditure declined sharply by 8.9 percentage points from an annual average of
30.8% in 1960-64 to 21.9% in 1965-69, and by a further sharp decline of 10.2
percentage points to 11.6% in 1970-74 period. Between the 1970-74 and 1980-84, the
share of social spending in total government expenditure stabilised around an average
of 11 %. Thereafter, the share increased sharply, reaching just under 38 % of total
government expenditure in the 1990-93 period.
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In relation to GDP, Table 2 and Figure 4 show that expenditure on social
services increased stabilised around an annual average of 3.3 % in the 1960s and 2.4 %
in the 1970s. Thereafter, the share in GDP increased sharply to around an average of
4.0% in the mid-1980s and then jumped to an annual average of over 12% in the early
1990s.
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Although expenditures on social services relative to total government
expenditure were generally high, especially in the 1960s and early 1990s, the benefits
were not equally distributed across the racial groups. The white minority received the
bulk of the benefits compared to the other race groups. The white population had
more access to good schools, health facilities, and welfare support systems compared
to the other racial groups.
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(d) Defence Spending
Table 2 shows that general government expenditure on defence amounted to an
annual average of R79.3 million during the 1960-64 period. Thereafter, defence
spending increased sharply to R211.9 million in each year of 1965-69 period,
representing an increase of 167 %. This sharp increase was to continue with stabilising
the country following the massacre in Sharpeville in 1961. The surge in defence
spending continued in the 1970s, where the expenditure averaged some R321.4
million in each year of 1970-74, and R1288.7 million in each year of 1975-79. The
average defence spending in the 1975-79 period represented an increase of over 300%
over the 1970-74 period. The government continued with its fight against the
liberation movements by allocating more resources to defence after the Soweto
uprising in 1976. Defence spending increased by 118.8 % to an annual average of
R2820.0 million in 1980-84, by 145.6% to an annual average of R6925.1 million in
1985-89, and by 56% to an annual average of R10804.1 million in 1990-93 period.
As the country became more isolated, it was believed that there as a continued threat
against the republic which necessitated increased spending on defence. In the early
1990s, due to the uncertainty as to the outcome of the fITst democratic elections,
defence spending was increased.
As a percentage of total government spending, defence spending fluctuated
between 10% and 16 % during the review period. The share increased to an annual
average of 15.6% in 1965-69, from an average of 10.5 % in 1960-64. The share,
however, declined to an average of 9.6% in 1970-74 but resumed growth, reaching
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an average of 15 % in the 1980s before declining sharply to an average of 10.2% in
the early 1990s (Table 2).
As a percentage of GDP, defence spending increased steadily from 1.4% in
each year of 1960-64 to an annual average of 3.9% in 1985-90, before declining to an
average of 3.4% in the 1990-93 period (Table 2 and Figure 5)
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The increases in defence spending during the period under review were due to
a number of events that took place within the country and outside its border. In
addition to the Sharpeville riots in 1960, the Soweto uprising in 1976 and the
countless strikes that took place in the 1980s, were also significant factors behind the
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surge in the defence spending. The five year defence expansion programme drawn in
1974 was also a contributory factor. In 1974, the perceived Soviet threat, resulting
from the collapse of the Portuguese colonies in Mozambique and Angola prompted
the defence expansion programme. The programme called for an increased expansion
of the country's military capability and the provision of military assistance to
Ovambo, Kavango, and Caprivi in the former South West Africa. This was to help
combat the activities of the South West Africa Peoples' Organisation (SWAPO). This
accounts for the doubling of the defence expenditures between 1974 and 1978 (Budget
Review, 1995).
In his analysis, Calitz (1986) shows that the major changes in expenditure
priorities since 1970/71, in respect of defence, economic services and transfers and
education (other than white education) during the first half of the 1980s were on
balance effected in a more or less incremental manner. The increased share of these
functions in budgeted expenditure was also accompanied by the allocation of an
increased percentage of GDP to these functions, but without a compensating decline in
the proportion of national resources mobilised for the remaining functions, causing the
expenditure on each function to increase without necessarily decreasing expenditure on
other functions (Calitz 1988).
3.3 Economic Classification
The central government budget is conceptually related to the state Revenue
Fund. The State Revenue Fund was established in April 1976 and was preceded by
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the Consolidated Revenue Fund. The latter fund was divided into several sub-sections
over its long history. The most important ones were the Revenue Account and the
Loan Account, which had existed ever since the formation of the Union in 1910. Up
to 1976, current expenditure were financed from the Revenue Account and capital
expenditures (including loans) from the Loan Account. This dual budgetary system
was widely believed to be a sound principle of public fmance, in the sense that, at
least, current expenditure should be financed from current revenue. Until the 1970s,
the government followed this practice of not financing any portion of the current
expenditure from loans (Heyns, 1982). In 1970, the Franzsen Commission
recommended that the distinction between the revenue account and the loan account be
abolished. This recommendation was accepted by the government and the two
accounts were merged in 1976 to become the State Revenue Fund.
Current Expenditure
Figure 6 shows that current expenditure as a percentage of GDP was 12.8% in
the 1960/61 fiscal year. The share, however, increased steadily until 1971/72, when
a significant jump to 18.5 % occurred. Thereafter, the share declined to 17.4% in
1975/76, and remained below 20% until 1982/83. In 1985/86 the share increased to
26.6% and continued to increase until it reached 31.8% in the 1993/94 fiscal year.
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Expenditure on goods and services was the largest contributor to the surge in
the current expenditure. During the 1960/61 - 1972/73 period, the share of
expenditure on goods and services was above 50% of the total current expenditure.
The share dropped to 47% in 1973/74 but increased again to between 50% - 60%
through to 1993/94 (Appendix 6). Ever increasing expenditure on the remuneration of
employees by the general government and additional expenditure, brought about by
the security situation in the country were predominantly responsible for the growth in
general government spending on goods and services. The share of expenditure on
remuneration of employees increased from 35.1% in 1988/89 to 40.5% in 1991/92
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(Budget Review 1995). This trend continued in the 1992/93 .
The large increase in current spending observed in the 1985/86 fiscal year was
also attributed to the large increases in expenditure on subsidies and transfers. The
increases in subsidies and transfers to household and economic institutions contributed
to the growth in government current spending. The elimination of racial disparities in
pensions and other social grants in the 1990s also contributed to the increase in the
share of current expenditure in total government expenditure. The restructuring of
business subsidies, however, led to declines in subsidies to sectors, such as agriculture
and commuter transport, and increases to the export oriented activities. Eventually,
agricultural subsidies which amounted to R160 million in 1990/91 were terminated in
1991/92. Expenditure on export promotion schemes, on other hand increased from
R850 million in 1990/91 to R2.7 billion in 1992/93 (Budget Review 1995), due
largely to the introduction of the revised General Export Incentive Scheme (GElS) in
1992.
Up to the beginning of the 1980s, the share of interest payments in total
current expenditure was below 10%. The share increased from 6.8 % in 1978/79 to
11.8% in 1979/80. Thereafter, the share decreased slightly to 10.7% and 9.7% in
1980/81 and 1981/82, respectively. The share increased steadily to 15.4% in 1985/86
but declined to 12.8% in 1987/88, and then increased to 15.1 % in 1989/90. In
1990/91 the share decreased to 13.9 % but increased steadily thereafter, reaching
16.2 % in 1993/94.
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Capital Expenditure
Capital expenditure as a percentage share of total government ranged between
20 % and 30% in the period leading to 1968. A huge increase to 36.3 % occurred in
1968/69, after which the share fell steadily to 24.2% in 1972/73. For most part of
the remaining period of the 1970s capital expenditure as percentage of total
government expenditure expanded, and by 1979/80 the share had increased to 30%.
A sharp of 7.6% occurred in 1985/86 as a result of the significant increase in the
current expenditure during that period. The decline in capital expenditure continued
in the 1990s when the share reached 5.6 % in 1990/91 fiscal year before increasing to
11.1 % in 1993/94.
Figure 7 shows the trend in the share of capital expenditure in GDP. As a
percentage of GDP, capital expenditure did not exceed 10% during the period 1960/61
- 1993/94. The share was 3.8% in 1960/61, but increased steadily thereafter,
reaching 9.5% in 1977/78. The share decreased to 6.6% in 1980/81 but increased to
8% in 1981/82. Thereafter the share decreased reaching 2.2 % in 1985/86. There
was a slight increase to 2.7% in 1986/87 and also to 4.3% in 1989/90. During
1990/91 and 1991/92 the share was 1.7% and it increased to 2.8% in 1992/93 , and
went up to 4% in 1993/94.
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During the 1968/69 - 1975/76 period, expenditure on the loan account on
railways and harbours, and housing increased by more than 100%, while expenditure
on water affairs increased by 81 %. In addition, some R274 million was made
available to the Department of Industries for the expansion of the iron and steel works.
An important aspect of the South Africa's expenditure is that there has been
since the 1980s an increasing tendency for actual expenditure to exceed the budgeted
expenditures. Calitz (1988) offers three possible explanations for the government's
inability to control expenditures. First, he explains the trend in terms of increased
instability in economic variables such as the exchange rate, interest rates and prices in
general, which tend to undermine the accuracy of the budget estimates. Second, he
attributed the trend increase partly to short-term stabilisation considerations, such as
drought relief measures or employment creation project. Third, the trend increase
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was attributed to the existence of policy and programme goals that were formulated
without taking into consideration what could be afforded. To the extent that these
possible explanations are true, the budgeted figures would continue to be exceeded






The approach we use for our analysis is based on the studies by Abedian and
Standish (1984). This approach examines the supply side of public output as viewed
through the total and major functional components of government expenditure. In this
framework, first, government expenditure is disaggregated by function in order to
determine the relative significance of each function and their contribution to the
growth in total expenditure. Second, the income elasticity of private demand for
public goods is estimated. The estimate is then used to determine the speed of the
government I S response to increased demand for its serVIces. Finally, the future
growth of each expenditure component is estimated, given some knowledge of the
GDP growth.
4.2 Contribution of Expenditure Categories
In identifying the sources of growth of government expenditure, Abedian and
Standish (1984) divide government expenditure, excluding expenditures by local
governmenf, into nine categories reflecting the functions provided by the state. These
include general administration, black administration, public order, community
2 Expenditure by local authorities were excluded from the
analysis due to the lack of disaggregated data.
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services, public debt, defence, health, education, and economic services. Then, they
postulated that three variables are very important in determining the growth in
expenditure categories. These variables are:
(i) the relative size of each expenditure category in the short-run,
(ii) the rate of growth of each expenditure category, and
(iii) the rate of growth of total expenditure.
The relative contribution of each expenditure category to changes in total government




G = total expenditure (both current and capital)
Xi = category i of total expenditure
Each of the components in equation (4.1) has its own budgetary and fiscal
significance. First, (X/G)t_l represents the short-run share of category i of expenditure
in the total expenditure. Its relative size underlines the fiscal significance that the state
attaches to it. Second, 8X/(X)t_l represents the percentage change of the expenditure
of category i (X) over any particular period. This ratio is significant in two ways: (i)
it shows the dynamics of the components of the government expenditure; and (ii) an
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analysis of 8X/(X)t_l for various periods illustrates the acceleration or otherwise in the
expansion of the various expenditure categories.
Third, compared with 8G/Gt_1, the size of the 8X/(X)t_l indicates whether or not an
expenditure category is to increase, decrease or maintain its relative significance
within the budget. Generally, three possibilities exist. If:
8X/(X)t_l > 8G/Gt_1, the share of Xi in total expenditure will rise;
8X/(X)t_l < 8G/Gt_1, the share of Xi in total expenditure will decline;
8X/(X)t_l = 8G/Gt_1, the share of Xi in total expenditure will not change.
In this study, government expenditure is divided into four major functional
categories. These include general administration, economic services, social services,
and defence. The relative contribution of each of the major categories to the changes
in total government expenditure during the 1960-1993 period, is calculated using
equation (4.1).
4.3 Income Elasticity of Expenditure
The income elasticity of government expenditure is defined as the ratio of the
percentage change in government expenditure to a percentage change in income
(Henning and Tussing, 1974). The elasticity coefficient shows how much government
expenditure will grow with respect to income growth. It must be emphasised that the
interpretation of the elasticity of income does not necessarily imply a causal
relationship between income and government expenditure. It is the ratio of the
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percentage change in government expenditure to the associated percentage change in
income that is of importance.
The estimation of the income elasticity of public expenditure in the literature
has largely involved a regression of government expenditure (G) or the ratio of
government expenditure to national income, (G/Y) , against national income (Y). That
IS:
where Ut is a random error term.
This procedure for estimating public expenditure elasticity has been criticised on
several grounds. According to Abedian and Standish (1984), equation (4.2) has two
implications: First, it is necessary to interpret the income elasticity of G, i.e. the value
of coefficient U 1 , in the logarithmic form as merely the ratio 8G%/8Y%. Any other
interpretation leads to the intractable argument over the direction of causality between
G and Y. Second, G is by definition a component of Y and so a least squares
regression of G on Y involves regressing government expenditure partly on itself. So
if one were to use ordinary least squares in fitting the relation between government
expenditure and GNP, the basic properties of the ordinary least squares will be
violated.
Another criticism levelled against using equation (4.2) to estimate government
expenditure elasticity is that, most studies of state expenditure presuppose that the
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(4.2)
supply of public goods always keep up with demand. This assumption is implied
when G is regressed against Y and an income elasticity is derived. In reality,
however, whether the supply and demand for public goods are equal depends
primarily on the speed with which the state adjusts its provision of goods and services.
Should the coefficient of state responsiveness be less than one, there would emerge a
wedge between the actual and the desired levels of public goods. This distinction
needs to be incorporated in any model analysing state expenditure (Abedian and
Standish, 1984).
To overcome the problems outlined above, Abedian and Standish (1984)
developed a model involving the use of indirect least squares3. In this model, instead
of regressing G against Y, G is rather fitted to private expenditures (P), (where P = Y
- G ). The private expenditure elasticity of government expenditure (Np) is then
estimated directly and from this the income elasticity of government expenditure (N
y
)
is derived. The relationship between the two elasticities is derived as follows:









Assuming that 'G' is some linear function of 'P', we can write:
The elasticity of 'G' with respect to 'P' would be
NG/P = Np = (8G/8P) (pIG) = a l (PIG)
From equation (4.4) we have






Rewriting equation (4.7) for G we have
G = [(X/ (l + (X1) ] Y + [(Xal (1 + (XI) ]
The elasticity of 'G' with respect to 'Y' would be
NGIY = Ny = (8G/8Y) (Y/G) = [(X/(1 + (XI) ] [ Y/G]
Replacing Y by its equivalent (P + G) from equation (4.3), equation (4.9) becomes
= [(X/(l + (XI) ] [(1 + P)/G ]
= [ 1 + (XI + (XI (PIG) - 1 ] I [ 1 + (XI ]
= 1 + [(XI (PIG) - 1 ] I [ 1 + (XI ]





Ny = 1 + [ (Np - 1) / (G/P)Np + 1 ]
Equation (4.11) establishes a relationship between government expenditure, ( Ny ) and
private expenditure elasticity ( Np ). Although many studies tend to focus on the
government expenditure elasticity, private expenditure elasticity is an important and
useful concept in its own right; being definitionally related to the government
expenditure elasticity, it tells us exactly the same things (Le. the causal relationship
between income and government expenditure) about the relation between G and Y,
and yields exactly the same forecasts. Moreover, the two elasticities, Ny and Np , will
always be both less than or both more than the critical value of unity (Henning and
Tussing, 1974).
To estimate Np and Ny the following model is defined:
Equation (4.12) states that Ge, the desired (or equilibrium) level of government
expenditure is dependent on private expenditure (P). The annual increase or decrease





Equation (4.13) implies that the actual change in government expenditure between
period t and period t-1 depends on:
(i) Ge/Gt_1, the wedge between the current desired level of government
expenditure and the immediate past level of the actual government
expenditure;
(ii) X/Xt_1, the level of military expenditure, which is a pure public good;
(iii) Z/Zt_l' a population variable (i.e. changes in the size of total population or
urbanization) .
Taking the log-linear forms of equations (4.12) and (4.13), we derive




gt = real non-defence government expenditure in period t (gt is the logarithm
of Gt, and the same is true of all abbreviations)
get = desired level of government expenditure in period t
Pt = real private expenditure in period t;
xt = real defence expenditure in period t;
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Zt = a population variable
Ur = random error term
a, b, C, d, and k are parameters to be estimated.





To test the model, equation (4.14) requires a transformation of the Hildreth-Lu type,
to take account of the probable autocorrelation in the error term, vt. To measure the
coefficient of autocorrelation, equation (4.15) can be used:
where a is the autocorrelation coefficient and et is the random error term with all the
standard characteristics. After a transformation of equation (4.15), the following
equation lends itself to empirical testing with no a priori expected autocorrelation in
the residual:
where:
git = real government expenditure in the ith category in period 1.
Pt = real private expenditure ( C + I + net exports) in period t.
Nt = real government expenditure on all other categories where [ i *- j (~i *- j




Zt = population variable
a, U, 8, d, k are parameters.
The lower case letters in the equation represent the logarithms of these
variables.
In the model, bk is the short-run private expenditure elasticity of government
expenditure while b is its counterpart in the long-run.
The model incorporates lagged government expenditure as one of the
explanatory variables to test the significance of the budgetary process in South Africa.
In view of the incremental method of budget preparation in the country, a positive
relationship is expected to exist between the level of government expenditure in the
current year with their past years' levels. The private expenditure coefficient, bk, is
expected to be positive. If the coefficient is positive and significantly different from
unity then the Wagner's law would have been proved for South Africa for the period
1960 - 1993. That is, government expenditure rises with a rise in the income level. A
negative relationship between the expenditure categories is expected. This is in line
with the assumption that an increase in government expenditure on one function
reduces the resources available to be spent on the others. However, there can also be
a positive relationship between any two functions or services if those functions or
services are complementary. The population variable is particularly important in the
South African context. Rapid population growth or increases in urbanization creates
huge demands for public goods and services, such as sanitation, health, education,
cultural and sports facilities, and so on.
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4.4 Future Trends in Government Expenditure
The speed with which governments respond to the demand for their goods and
services, i.e., k in equation (4.16), is critical for any analysis of the growth of the size
of government. Given the expected growth of national income and the long-run
income elasticity of demand it is possible to forecast the limiting rate of change in the
state expenditure. To determine the limiting or maximum rate of growth of
government expenditure gt, as income Yt grows, we use the expression:
where:
rg is the rate of growth of government expenditure
ry is the rate of growth of income
b is the long run income elasticity of demand
Equation (4.17) shows that as income grows, the actual level of expenditure will
always fall short of the specified fraction of the desired level of expenditure even in
the limit. Moreover, the more rapidly income grows, the greater would this shortfall
be. The shortfall is due to the delayed response of actual expenditure to changes in
income. If income were not to grow at all, actual expenditure would approach more
and more closely to the desired or equilibrium value. But if income grows, then the
desired value of expenditure grows as well and becomes a moving target towards
which the actual expenditure is constantly adJ·usting. In the limit the G / Ge ratio
, t It'
will be measured as:
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(4.17)
Lim (G/GeJ = (l + r )b[l-(lIk)]
l~rxJ y
From these limiting cases it is clear that if ry = 0, or k = 1, the ratio G/G
e
t
approaches unity, Le. the case of no lags in the response of gt to Yt, regardless of the






The results of the estimated expenditure functions are presented in this chapter.
The functions were estimated using time series data for the period 1960-1993. The
computer package used in estimating the models is Shazam version 7.0, developed by
White (1992). The equations are estimated in their logarithm forms using the ordinary
least squares technique. The test of significance of the estimated coefficients was
undertaken at the 10% level using the two tail test procedure.
5.2 Data Sources and Reliability
Data for the empirical analysis were obtained from two main sources:
(i) The Central Statistical Service of South Africa (CSSSA).
Among others, the CSSSA publishes annually the South African Statistics.
This publication contains time series data on government expenditure under functional
and economic classifications. All data related to government expenditure were
obtained from the various issues of this publication.
(ii) The South African Reserve Bank (SARB).
Like the CSSSA, the SARB publishes occasionally the National Income
Accounts of South Africa and the Public Finance Statistics of South Africa. Data on
gross domestic product, private expenditure (private consumption, private investment
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and net exports) were extracted from the June 1994 issue of the National Income
Accounts 1946 -1993.
All the expenditure data in nominal terms that had to be converted into real
values were done using the consumer price index with 1990 as the base year. The
gross domestic product was converted into real terms using the gross domestic product














Government expenditure on general administration
Government expenditure on economic services
Government expenditure on social services




Black population (Africans + Coloureds + Indians)
Total government expenditure less administration
Total government expenditure less economic services
Total government expenditure less social services
Total government expenditure less defence
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5.3 Results
(a) Relative Contribution of Expenditure Categories
Table 3 presents the relative contribution of the expenditure categories to
changes in total government expenditure for the 1960-1993 period, using equation
(4.1). The table shows that expenditure on general administration contributed the most
to the growth in total government expenditure, contributing some 66% in 1961-70,
and 58 % in 1971-80. In 1981-88, the relative contribution to total government
spending by general administration expenditure was 66 %. During the 1989-1991
period, the contribution of general administration to total government spending was
actually negative. The relative contribution was 28% and 32% in 1992 and 1993,
respectively.
The contribution of expenditure on economic services fluctuated significantly
but remained positive throughout the 1961-1993 period except in 1985. In 1961 the
relative contribution to total government expenditure by economic services
expenditure was 4 %. The relative contribution increased to 25 % in 1963 and then
declined reaching 7 % in 1964 and 1965. The relative contribution increased to 26 %
in 1967 before decreasing to 5 % in 1968. In 1969-1975 it fluctuated between 10%-
25%, except for 1973 when it was 5%. From the late 1970s until the mid-1980s, the
relative contribution was below 10%, except in 1978 when it was 20%and 1985 when
it was negative. In 1990, the relative contribution increased to 99%.
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TABLE 3: RELATIVE CONTRIBUTION OF EACH EXPENDITURE CATEGORY TO GROWTH IN
TOTAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE, 1960 - 1993
YEARS ADMINISTRATION ECONOMIC SOCIAL DEFENCE TOTAL
SERVICES SERVICES
1961 0.43 0.04 0.14 0.39 1
1962 0.22 0.13 0.03 0.61 1
1963 0.52 0.25 0.40 -0.16 1
1964 0.32 0.07 0.10 0.51 1
1965 0.82 0.07 0.27 -0.15 1
1966 0.42 0.15 0.23 0.20 1
1967 0.65 0.26 0.05 0.05 1
1968 2.01 0.05 -1.10 -0.06 1
1969 0.71 0.16 0.09 0.06 1
1970 0.53 0.28 0.16 0.00 1
1971 0.74 0.11 0.08 0.08 1
1972 0.48 0.25 0.02 0.03 1
1973 0.90 0.05 0.17 0.15 1
1974 0.56 0.21 0.10 0.23 1
1975 0.34 0.24 0.06 0.22 1
1976 0.60 0.08 0.10 0.27 1
1977 0.57 0.03 0.12 0.25 1
1978 0.69 0.20 0.09 0.05 1
1979 0.66 0.08 0.15 0.34 1
1980 0.22 0.08 0.10 0.12 1
1981 1.23 0.07 0.25 0.21 2
1982 0.46 0.08 0.11 0.08 1
1983 0.69 0.11 0.11 0.05 1
1984 0.86 0.06 0.15 0.15 1
1985 0.51 -0.04 0.31 0.08 1
1986 0.73 0.07 0.15 0.18 1
1987 0.31 0.15 0.33 0.20 1
1988 0.49 0.05 0.14 0.13 1
1989 -0.79 0.28 1.09 -0.01 1
1990 -5.11 0.99 3.41 0.11 -1
1991 -0.68 0.38 1.48 0.06 1
1992 0.28 0.33 0.43 -0.03 1
1993 0.32 0.17 0.44 0.08 1
Source: Computed uSing equation (4.1)
The contribution of social services fluctuated significantly during the period.
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The share ranged between 3% and 341 %. In 1968, however, social services
contribution was negative. Social services was the largest contributor in 1987 and also
during the 1989 - 1993 period. In 1990, the social services contribution was 341 %,
the largest contribution by any expenditure item in the review period. The large
contribution of social services to the growth of government expenditure in this period
may be due to the fact that during the early 1990s the government attempted to close
the gap in social benefits payments received by the different race groups.
(b) Expenditure Elasticities
(i) General Administration
The estimated elasticities of administration expenditure are presented in Table
5.1. In equation (a), the adjusted R2 is 0.94, indicating that the explanatory variables
together explain at least 94% of the variations in government expenditure on general
administration. The Durbin-h statistic of 1.2, falls within the zone of indecision,
indicating no evidence of serial correlation. The standard error of the estimates (SEE)
is 0.08. The coefficient of the private expenditure variable has the expected positive
sign and is statistically significant. The size of the coefficient indicates that a 1%
proportionate increase in private expenditure will lead to a 1.9% proportionate
increase in expenditure on general administration. The coefficient of the total non-
administrative expenditure has the expected negative sign but not significant. The
coefficients of both the white and black population variables have the expected signs,
and are statistically significant, while the coefficient of the lagged administration
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expenditure has the expected positive sign but is statistically insignificant.
In an attempt to improve upon the results, the model was re-estimated leaving
out the white population variable because it was found to be highly correlated with the
black population variable. The results of the re-estimated model is presented in
equation (b) in Table 5.1. The adjusted R2 in equation (b) decreased slightly to 92 %,
while the h- statistic remained the same. The SEE increased slightly but it is still
reasonably low. The results in equation (b) show that the coefficients of all the
variables have the expected signs, but the coefficients of non-administrative
expenditure, black population, and lagged administration expenditure were not
significant.
The equation was also re-estimated, first leaving out the black population
variable because it was highly correlated with the white population variable The
results shown in equation (c) gave an h- statistic of 2.8, implying the presence of frrst
order positive serial correlation, while the adjusted R2 increased by one percentage
point to 0.93 %. The size of the constant term increased significantly in this
estimation. The size of the private expenditure coefficient decreased but had the
correct sign and significant. The coefficient of non-administrative expenditure also
had the correct sign and significant this time. The white population variable had a
positive sign but was not significant. The sign of the coefficient of the lagged
administration expenditure remained positive but was not significant.
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Table 5.1 Estimated Elasticities of Government Expenditure on General Administration, 1960 - 1993.
Eqtn Dependent Variable Constant Pvt Tad Wpop Bpop Admin_ 1 Adjusted R 2 h SEE
(a) General Administration -2.5 1.9 -0.2 6.01 -3.3 0.03 0.94 1.2 0.08
(-2.5) (3.2) (-0.9) (2.7) (-3) (0.6)
(b) General Administration -0.9 2.8 -0.2 -1.3 0.07 0.92 1.2 0.09
(0.4) (5.4) (-0.8) (-1.4) (1.09)
(c) General Administration -3.5 1.8 -0.5 1.4 0.09 0.93 2.8 1.0
(-3.2) (2.7) (-2.3) (0.8) (1.6)
(d) General Administration -4.1 2.3 -0.4 1.0 0.92 2.5 0.1
(-5.8) (6.4) (-2.2) (1.6)
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Finally, the two population variables that were highly correlated with each
other were dropped and the model re-estimated. The results presented as equation (d)
appears to be relatively better in the sense that all the explanatory variables had the
correct signs and are significant. The h-statistic shows that there is autocorrelation
while the adjusted R2 remained unchanged. According to the results a 1%
proportionate increase in private spending will cause an increase in government
spending on general administration by 2.3 %, proportionally. Also a 1% proportionate
increase in non-administrative expenditure will lead to a 0.4% proportionate decrease
in government spending on general administration. Finally, holding everything else
constant, past level of government spending on general administration have positive
influence on the current year's administration spending.
(ii) Economic services
The results of the estimated elasticities for government expenditure on
economic services are presented in Table 5.2. The t-statistics are presented in the
brackets below.
Equation (a) shows that the explanatory variables together explain 96% of the
variation in government expenditure on economic services. The h-statistic of 0.6
implies that there is no evidence of serial correlation, while the SEE value of 0.07 is
reasonably low.
The coefficient of private expenditure variable has the expected positive sign,
but not significant. The coefficient of the non-economic expenditure variable has an
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unexpected positive sign significant. The size of the coefficient shows that a 1%
proportionate increase in government spending on economic services will lead to a
2.2% proportionate increase in government spending on non-economic services. The
coefficient of the white population variable has a negative sign and is statistically not
significant. On the other hand, the coefficient of the black population variable has the
expected negative sign and is significant. The size of the coefficient shows that a 1%
proportionate increase in black population will lead to a 3.7 % proportionate decrease
in government expenditure on economic services. The coefficient of the lagged
economic services expenditure variable has an unexpected negative sign and is not
significant.
Given the high correlation between the black and the white population
variables, we re-estimated the model without the white population variable since it was
found to be a non-significant factor. The results are presented as equation (b) of
Table 5.2. In equation (b) the coefficient for the private expenditure variable has the
expected positive sign but still not significant. The coefficient for the non-economic
services had an unexpected positive sign and significant, although its the size remained
the same. The coefficient for the black population variable has the expected negative
sign and is strongly significant, while the lagged dependent variable came out with a
wrong sign and also insignificant.
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Table 5.2 Estimated Elasticities of Government Expenditure on Economic Services, 1960 - 1993
Eqtn Dependent Variable Constant Pvt Ted Wpop Bpop Econ_ 1 Adjusted R
2 h SEE
(a) Economic Services 0.5 0.3 2.2 -0.2 -3.7 -0.004 0.96 0.6 0.07
(0.6) (0.5) (7.7) (-0.1) (-4.6) (-0.07)
(b) Economic Services 0.6 0.2 2.2 -3.8 -0.005 0.96 0.6 0.07
(0.8) (0.5) (8.1) (-6.4) (-0.08)
(c) Economic Services -2.2 1.1 0.3 0.87 2.4 0.1
(-3.6) (4.6) (2.9)
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Equation (b) was re-estimated with only the private expenditure and lagged
dependent variables as the arguments. The results presented in equation (c) shows
that, the two explanatory variables have the right signs and were significant. A 1%
increase in private expenditure will cause a 1.1 % proportionate increase in economic
expenditure, whereas 30% of the present level of economic spending is determined by
the past level of economic spending.
(iii) Social services
The estimated expenditure elasticities on social services are presented in Table
5.3. The t-statistic for each coefficient is presented in the brackets below the
coefficients. The adjusted R2 value shows that about 90% of the variation in total
government expenditure on social services are explained by the changes in the
explanatory variables. The h-statistic shows that it is not possible to reject the
presence of positive serial correlation.
The results as presented in equation (a) of Table 5.4 are very poor. All the
estimated coefficients have the wrong signs, except that of the non-social services
expenditure. In addition, three of the five coefficients are not significant.
Upon verification, the black population variable was found to be highly
correlated with the private expenditure variable, which itself was found to be
correlated with the non-social spending variable. Equation (a) was therefore re-
estimated without the black population variable. The new results produced significant
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coefficients for the non-social spending, white population, and lagged d.ependent
variables. The coefficient for the white population variable came out with the
expected sign. The income variable remained insignificant. The h-statistic, however,
shows that there is positive first order serial correlation in this estimation.
Equation (c) in Table 5.3 shows the results without the white population
variable. In this equation the income variable is negative but significant. The lagged
expenditure variable is now not significant. The results did not improve much so the
model was re-estimated again leaving out the two population variables. The results
presented in equation (d) show that the coefficients of the remaining variables came
out with the expected signs and were all significant. The h-statistic shows traces of
serial correlation. The income elasticity of 3.2 implies that a unit percentage change
in private incomes will cause government spending on social services to expand by
3.2% . Also a 1% proportionate increase in government spending on non-social
services leads to a 1.2% proportionate decrease in government spending on social
serVIces.
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Table 5.3 Estimated Elasticities of Government Expenditure on Social Services, 1960 - 1993
Eqtn Dependent Variable Constant Pvt Tsd Wpop Bpop Soc_1 Adjusted R
2 h SEE
(a) Social Services -1.4 -0.8 -0.8 -1.0 6.2 -0.01 0.90 -2.55 0.1
(-1. 0) (-0.9) (-2.3) (-0.3) (3.7) -(0.2)
(b) Social Services -0.2 -0.4 -1.1 9.1 0.2 0.79 3.4 0.1
(-0.09) (-0.3) (-3.4) (3.5) (1.6)
(c) Social Services 1.1 -2.3 -0.4 6.3 0.06 0.90 1.4 0.1
(0.9) (-2.5) (-1.8) (7.1) (0.9)
(d) Social Services -5.6 3.2 -1.2 0.3 0.70 3.8 0.2
(-3.6) (3.9) (-3.1) (2.6)
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(iv) Defence
The results of the estimated elasticities of government expenditure on defence
are reported in Table 5.4. Like the other tables the t-statistics are presented in the
brackets below each coefficient. The results as presented in equation (a) show that all
the coefficients, with the exception of that of the white population, came out with the
wrong sign. Not only that but also all the coefficients were not significant, sake for
the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable.
Upon verification, the two population variables were found to be highly
correlated with themselves. These variables were therefore dropped one after the
other and the model re-estimated. The results of the re-estimated model with no black
population variable is reported as equation (b), and the one with no white population
as equation (c). Although the two results produced coefficients with the right signs,
except that of the non-defence expenditure, they were all poor. Except for the lagged
defence expenditure variable, none of the other variables was found to be a significant
determinant of defence expenditure. The model was therefore re-estimated leaving out
the two population variables and the results reported in equation (d).
Equation (d) shows that the lagged dependent variable and the private
expenditure coefficients are significant, while non-defence spending variable remained
insignificant. The private income elasticity of defence shows that a 1% increase in
private spending will cause defence spending to increase by a proportional 0.8 %.
Also, holding everything constant, past level of defence spending was found to have
positively affected defence spending. For this variable, a 1%change in it caused
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Table 5.4 Estimated Elasticities of Government Expenditure on Defence, 1960 - 1993
Eqtn Dependent Variable Constant Pvt Totldef Wpop Bpop Def-1 Adjusted R 2 h SEE
(a) Defense -1.6 0.6 0.5 0.06 0.24 0.5 0.95 1.05 0.08
(-1.4) (1.03) (0.2) (0.03) (0.3) (5.5)
(b) Defense -1.5 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.95 1.05 0.08
(-1.4) (1.1) (0.2) (0.4) (5.7)
(c) Defense -1.6 0.7 0.05 0.3 0.5 0.95 1.4 0.08
(-1. 7) (1.2) (0.2) (0.4) (5.8)
(d) Defense -1.7 0.8 0.07 0.4 0.95 1.05 0.08
(-2.0) (1.8) (0.3) (5.8)
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0.4% change in current defence expenditures.
(v) Total non-defence government expenditure
Table 5.5 presents the results of estimated elasticities of the total non-defence
government spending. The t-statistics are in the brackets below each coefficient. The
coefficient of the private expenditure in equation (a) has the expected positive sign but
not significant. The defence spending coefficient has an both a wrong sign and not
significant. The coefficients of the two population variables came out with wrong
signs, although the coefficient for the black population variable was significant. The
lagged non-defence spending variable also has a negative sign and insignificant.
The two population variables found to be highly correlated with themselves
were dropped and the model re-estimated. The results presented in equation (b) show
that the coefficients of the private expenditure and defence variables were significant
while the lagged total non-defence expenditure coefficient was not. The private
expenditure coefficient has a correct sign. The other explanatory variables have
unexpected signs. The private income elasticity of non-defence spending was
estimated at 1.3, indicating that a 1% proportionate change in private incomes will
lead to a 1.3% proportionate change in non-defence spending. The positive sign for
the defence spending coefficient was not expected.
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Table 5.5 Estimated Elasticities of Total Non-Defence Government Expenditure, 1960 - 1993
Eqtn Dependent Variable Constant Pvt Def Wpop Bpop To(! Adjusted R2 h SEE
(a) Totldef -1.32 0.4 0.1 -0.02 1.9 -0.002 0.98 0.03 0.04
(-1.96) (1.02) (0.92) (-0.02) (2.2) (-0.07)
(b) Totldef -1.8 1.3 0.2 0.002 0.98 0.2 0.05
(-2.6) (5.0) (1.8) (0.1)
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(c) Future Trends in Government Expenditure
Table 5.6 shows the limiting percentage growth in expenditure on general
administration, economic services, social services, defence spending, and total non-
defence spending. Average growth rates of income have been chosen for each decade.
The average growth rate of income was 6.4% in 1960- 1969; 4.6% in 1970-1979,
3.2% in 1980-1989; and in 1990 - 1993 it was -0.8 %. The speed of response (k), and
the long-run income elasticity of government expenditure (b) are presented for each
function in table 5.6:
Table 5.6: Limiting Percentage Growth in Government Expenditure
Years Rate of Administration Economic Social Defence Total
growth of rib =2.5) services serVIces rg(b= 1.3) expenditure
income, ry rib = 1.6) rg(b=4.6) rib = 1.3)
1960 - 69 6.4 148 24 9964 13 13
1970 - 79 4.6 73 15 2764 8 8
1980 - 89 3.2 35 9 735 5 5
1990 - 93 -0.8 -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 -0.9
In the model used for our empirical analysis, it was found that actual
government spending is always a fraction of the desired level of government spending.
The higher the growth rate in income, the larger the gap between actual and desired
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level of government spending will become. While the growth rate in actual
government expenditure is assumed to increase, it could be constrained by the growth
rate in income, whereas the desired level of government spending is not constrained
by the rate of increase in income. Therefore, the growth rate of desired level of
government spending exceeds the growth rate of actual government spending. When
the average growth rate in income is negative, the rate of growth of government
expenditure is also negative as shown in Table 5.6. The entries in the table show that
if the income growth rate is 6.4 %, the rate of growth of total non-defence government
expenditure will be 13 %. If income declines by 0.8 % total non-defence government
spending will also decline by a larger proportion, 0.9 %.
The average rate of growth for the national income during the 1970-79 period
was 4.6%. Table 5.6 show that the rate of growth of government expenditure on
general administration was 73 %, economic services was 15 %, social services was
2764 %, and defence was 8%. During this period, total expenditure grew by 8%.
The results in Table 5.6 also show that, the more elastic the expenditure function, the
higher will be the growth in government expenditure with a given percentage increase
in income. Social services is more elastic compared to the other functions, as depicted
by its long-run income elasticity coefficient of 4.6. The large long-run income
elasticity coefficient is responsible for the extremely high increase in expenditure on
social services. The increase in expenditure on social services during the 1960-69
period, when income grew by 6.4 % was 9964 %. Comparing this to defence which
was less elastic, (b = 1.3), the growth in spending was 13 %. The long-run income
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elasticity of defence is the same as the long-run income elasticity of total non-defence
spending. In each period, the growth in defence spending with a given increase in
income is the same as the growth in total non-defence spending.
During the 1990-93 period, the rate of growth of income was negative. The
growth rate in each expenditure category was also negative. It is therefore necessary
for the government to ensure that the growth in income is positive before it can think
of any increase in government spending. The long run income elasticity of is also
important in determining whether government expenditure will increase or decrease
and by how much. The growth of government spending on all the functions was
positive whenever the growth in income was positive, and became negative as the
growth in income became negative.
Table 5.7 shows the limiting ratio between actual and desired level of
government spending. The table shows that with the growth rate of income of 6.4%
the ratio of actual to desired total government spending was 93 %. When income
decreases by 0.8 % the ratio increases to 125 %. As income grows larger, the gap
between the desired and actual level of government spending becomes wider. In
Table 5.7, with the growth rate of income of 6.4 %, actual government spending on
general administration was 87 % of the desired level of government spending,
spending on economic services was 71 % of the desired level, spending on social
services was 37% of the desired level, and spending on defence was 64% of the
desired level. When income decreases by 0.8 %, i.e. period 1990-1993, the ratio of
desired to actual government spending increases to 157% for administration, 304 %
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for economic services, 25 % for social services, and 432 % for defence spending.
Table 5.7: Limiting Ratio of Actual and desired Level of Government Spending
Years Rate of Administration Economic Social Defence Total
growth of G/G\ Services Services G/G\ Expenditure
income ry b = 2.5 G/G\ G/G\ b = 1.3 G/G\
k = 0.9 b = 1.6 b = 4.6 k = 0.6 b = 1.3
k = 0.7 k = 0.7 k = 0.9
1960 - 69 6.4 0.87 0.71 0.37 0.64 0.93
1970 - 79 4.6 0.90 0.77 0.50 0.71 0.95
1980 - 89 3.2 0.93 0.83 0.57 0.78 0.96
1990 - 93 -0.8 1.57 3.04 25 4.32 1.25
Table 5.8 gives information on the speed of response of government spending,
and the short-and long-run expenditure elasticities. The speed of response (k) is
calculated using the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable in equation 4.16. For
general administration, the speed of response between actual and desired level of
government spending is 0.9. This means that the actual government spending catches
up with only 90% of the desired level of government spending. The short-run
expenditure elasticity is 2.3 and the long-run expenditure elasticity is 2.5. In the short
run government expenditure responds to the desired levels by 2.3 % and it responds by
2.5 % in the long-run. The speed of response between the actual and the desired
81
government expenditure on economic services is 0.7, and the same is true for social
services. Actual government spending on economic and social services responds to
0.7% of the desired level of spending in each of these categories. The short and long-
run expenditure elasticities for economic services are 1.1 and 1.6 respectively. That
is, in the short-run, actual government expenditure is about 1.1 % of the desired level
compared to 1.6% in the long-run. The short and long-run expenditure elasticities in
social spending are 3.2 and 4.6 respectively. In the short-run actual government
expenditure is 3.2%of the desired level and 4.6 % in the long-run.
For defence spending, the speed of response between actual and desired level
is 0.6. The short-run expenditure elasticity is 0.8. Its long-run counterpart is 1.3. In
the short-run actual defence spending is about 0.8 % of the desired level and it is 1.3%
of the desired level in the long-run.
In the total non-defence spending category the speed of response between
actual and desired level of spending is 0.9. The short-run expenditure elasticity is the
same as the long-run income elasticity, 1.3.
82
Table 5.8: Speed of Response, Short- and Long-Run Elasticities of Government Expenditure
Constant Private Lagged Other Speed Of Short-Run Long-Run
Expenditure Dependent Response Expenditure Expenditure
Variable (k) Elasticity Elasticity
Administration -4.1 2.3 0.09 -0.4 0.9 2.3 2.5
Economic -2.2 1.1 0.3 0.7 1.1 1.6
Services
Social Services -5.6 3.2 0.3 -1.2 0.7 3.2 4.6
Defence -1.7 0.8 0.4 0.07 0.6 0.8 1.3
Total -1.8 1.3 0.002 0.2 0.9 1.3 1.3
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5.4 Discussion of the Results
Table 5.9 shows the estimated income elasticities of the non-defence
total expenditure and the major components of the government expenditure.
Table 5.9: Income Elasticities of Government Expenditure, 1960 - 1993
Expenditure Short-run income elasticity Long-run income elasticity
Total non-defence expenditure 1.3 1.3
General administration 2.3 2.5
Economic services 1.1 1.6
Social services 3.2 4.6
Defence 0.8 1.3
Source: Computed from Tables 5.1 - 5.5, using equation (4.11)
The short and long-run income elasticities are positive and greater than
unity for all the functional categories, providing support for the existence of
the Wagner's Law. The short-run income elasticity for defence spending is
slightly less than unity.
General Administration
The estimated income elasticity of expenditure on general administration in the
short run was 2.3 and for the long run the elasticity was 2.5. This implies that
expenditure on general administration increased more than the proportionate
increase in income
84
An important factor that caused government expenditure on
administration to grow during the 1960-1993 period was the administrative
structures that came into being with the inception of the apartheid system.
During the period under review, the country was divided into different
provinces each with its own administrative. Politically, the country was
divided into four provinces namely, Natal, Cape, Orange Free State, and the
Transvaal. In addition there were the independent states of Transkei,
Bophuthatswana, Venda, Ciskei, and the self-governing territories of
KwaZulu, Lebowa, QwaQwa, KaNgwane, Gazankulu, and KwaNdebele. The
creation of the homelands system coincided with the inception of a tricameral
parliamentary system, where three houses, one each for the coloureds, indians,
and whites, were established.
For administrative purposes, the country was divided into 275 districts
in 1970, 266 of which were controlled by white magisterial districts and 9
were designated as black homelands largely controlled by Africans. At that
time, only 21 of the 275 districts had productive capacities to contribute 1% or
more to the total output of the country (Nattrass, 1990).
The result of the intricately woven administrative set-up was that
government expenditure on general administration exploded. In particular,
expenditure on wages and salaries of government employees rose from 8.4%
of GDP in 1980 to more than 35% in 1988, and to over 40% in the 1991/92
fmancial year (Lachman and Bercusson, 1992; South African Government
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Budget Review, 1995). The increases in the wages bill in the early 1990s was
attributed to the process of phasing out the disparities in wages and salaries
across the different racial groups as well as improving the relative wage levels
of the lowest paid civil servants.
The fragmentation of the country into smaller states and provinces also
created more bureaucracies and duplication of government functions and
serVIces. For instance, agriculture, education, and health, each had 14
ministries and four provincial administrations. There were also 11 ministries
of finance, 11 ministries of industrial development, and 12 development
corporations, including the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), and the
Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA). The general government budget
itself was also handled by different bodies. The budget of the four provinces
was handled by the national Treasury, while that of the independent states was
handled by the department of Foreign Affairs, and those for the self-governing
territories by the Department of Constitutional Development.
As the scope of the administrative functions of the government
increased overtime so also was the government's wages bill and expenditure on
administration. The increases in the wage bill came about not only as a result
of the expansion of the size of the civil service but also as a result of the
increase in the remunerative demands. During the review period, the private
sector wages increased significantly due wage demands, strikes, and inflation.
To avoid losing its skilled employees to the private sector, the public sector
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had to match the private sector wages which contributed to the surge in
government expenditure, particularly expenditure in administration.
During the period under review, the government was involved in
various activities, aimed at restoring law and order, protection of property
(especially properties belonging to the white population), and suppression of its
political opponents. Consequently, expenditure on protection services
increased significantly. In 1960, 18.2% of expenditure on general
administration accounted for was by expenditure on protection services. By
1993, the figure had risen to 28 %.
Economic Services
The positive and greater than unity government expenditure elasticity
on economic services implies a much faster growth in expenditure in economic
services than the growth in national income. This was due mainly to the
extensive involvement of the public sector in the industrial activities during
the review period. The government's involvement in economic activity,
particularly after 1972, took the form of the establishment of several state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), such as SASOL, ESKOM, ISCOR, and
ARMSCOR, after 1972 (Nattrass, 1990). The predominance of the SOEs in
the electricity, gas and water and transport and storage sub-sectors reflected
the continued commitment of the successive governments as the major
provider of infrastructural investment (Nattrass 1990).
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Government
expenditure on economic services also expanded due to the continuous
increases in subsidies to the mining and agricultural sectors. Financial
assistance, taking the form of drought relief and capital assistance, was granted
to the mining and agricultural operations by the whites. In real terms, total
expenditure on economic services in 1960 was R80. 9 million. Of this, 8%
went to the transport sector, 74% to agriculture, the industrial sector and the
mining sector each received 9%. In 1993, the agriculture's share declined to
26 % whereas transport and industry increased their share to 32% and 34 %
respectively. The mining sector share was 8%.
Government assistance to white farmers in 1965-1970 averaged 19.3%
of the net farming income (Nattrass, 1990). The state's aid to the agriculture
sector came in different forms, with the largest being payments made to
stabilise prices paid to the producers of the various products. In 1975,
approximately 58% of government aid to agriculture went towards price
stabilisation. Other government assistance to the sector went to subsidise the
costs of fuel and fertiliser as well as soil conservation and the provision of
water (Nattrass, 1990).
Government expenditure on economic services ID the mid-1960s
increased also because of increased allocations to the railways and harbours,
housing, and water affairs. During this period the Orange River Project got
underway, causing expenditure on water affairs to increase significantly.
During this period also, the IDC started developing industries along the
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country's borders as well as investing in aircraft and synthetic rubber
development. The border industries were established to attract cheap labour
from the homelands and self-governing territories to the industrial sector and
also to stop the inflow of black people into the big cities of the Republic. The
Bantu Trust was also established to develop the Bantu areas (Browne 1983).
Social Services
Our investigation shows the income elasticity of social spending was
positive and different from unity, indicating that there was a much faster
growth in social spending with each growth in income.
During the period under review, there was a significant increase in
government spending on education. This increase in expenditure was also due
to the duplication of activities by the various education departments that were
created under the apartheid era. It must, however, not be taken for granted
that this increase in education spending affected all racial groups equally.
Lachman and Bercusson (1992) mention that in 1990 per capita expenditure on
white school children was more than four times higher than for blacks. Health
spending was also highly skewed in South Africa. The health spending on
blacks was one half that on the other population groups.
Another factor that contributed to the increase in social spending was
the government's attempt to close the gap between social benefits, especially
pensions received by the different racial groups in the 1990s. Spending on
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social services increased also because with industrialization comes the demand
for health, educational, sanitation, and sporting facilities. So as South Africa
gets more industrialized and as more and more blacks move into the urban
areas there is an increasing demand for these facilities.
In the early 1990s, expenditure on social services increased
significantly as the government attempted to close the gap between welfare
payments received by the different racial groups as well as extending the
welfare benefits to people who were previously disadvantaged. The functions
which benefited most from the surge in social services expenditure were
education, social security, and welfare services.
A comparative study by Lachman and Bercusson (1992), reveals that
expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP in South Africa substantially
exceeded that of the middle-income and of the industrial nations in 1982 and
1987. Further, expenditure on health care as a percentage of GDP
significantly exceeded that of the other upper-middle-income countries (SARB
1991). However, they (Lachman and Bercusson) found that expenditure on
social security and welfare have lagged behind those of other countries.
The growth of unemployment compensation also contributed to the
sharp increases in government expenditure on social security and welfare
payments during the 1990s. The rising expenditure on social services was
partly driven by demographic and social trends, which could not be adjusted
downwards when the revenue performance weakened during the recession of
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the early 1990s (Budget Review, 1994).
Defence
The short-run income elasticity of defence expenditure on defence was
less than unity during the review period, implying that the growth in defence
spending was less than the growth in income. In the long-run, however, the
income elasticity of the defence expenditure was significantly different from
unity. Therefore, in the long-run expenditure on defence increased faster than
the increase in income.
South African defence expenditure has been increasing due mainly to
the political instability in the country. In 1960 there was the Sharpeville
incident which set a trend for continuous struggles against the apartheid
system. The government perceived the opposition to the apartheid system as a
threat to the Republic of South Africa and thereby responded by allocating
more resources to the defence force and the other security agencies. The
Sharpeville incident was followed by another major uprising in 1976 in
Soweto. The continued resistance by the political movements to the apartheid
system made the government to continue to increase its expenditure on national
defence. Another factor to the increased defence spending came with the
establishment of the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei (TBVC)
and self-governing states. The Transkei, Ciskei, Venda, and Bophuthatswana
governments, established their own defence and other security forces, which
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depended on funding from the South African government. The South African
defence force itself was also involved in the Angolan war which had serious
budgetary implications for the government. All these factors led to the
increase in the expenditure on defence in each fiscal year.
Total Non-Defence Government Expenditure
Both in the long-run and in the short-run, total non-defence government
spending grew faster than the growth in income. The income elasticities were
positive and grater than unity, both in the short run and long run.
92
Chapter Six
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
This study set out to investigate the growth of government expenditure ill
South Africa during the 1960-1993 period. First, the study examines the relative
contribution of each of the functional categories to the growth of total government
expenditure. Second, it investigates the sources of growth of government expenditure.
Third, it estimates the future growth in government expenditure, given the rate of
growth of gross domestic product.
Our findings show that expenditure on administration contributed the most to
the growth of total government expenditure throughout the review period, although
the contribution turned negative after 1989. The contribution averaged some 70 % in
1961-1970, 60% in 1971-80, and negative 6% in 1981-1990. In 1991-1993, the
contribution was negative. Following expenditure on administration, in terms of the
magnitude of the contribution, was defence, which contributed 15 % on average,
during 1961-1970. During this period economic services also contributed 15 %, and
social services 4%. During 1971-80, defence spending contributed 17 %, economic
services 13 %, and social services 9%. Economic services contributed more than
defence in 1981-1990, 18% and defence 12%. Social services contribution declined
to 6% during the same period. In 1990-93, social services contributed 80 %, defence
40 %, and economic services, 30 %.
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The estimated long-run income elasticities of government expenditure were all
found to be greater than unity, indicating that government expenditure increases more
than proportionally to economic growth. The income elasticity for social services was
4.6%, 2.5 % for administration, 1.5% for economic services, and 1.3% to defence
spending. The income elasticity for total non-defence spending was also 1.3%. These
income elasticities seem to confirm the Wagner's law.
The study also found that private expenditure, expenditure on non-
administration, and previous levels of expenditure were the most influential factors
that affected government spending on general administration. For the economic
services, private spending and past expenditure levels were the important factors. As
with general administration, social services spending was influenced significantly by
private spending, non-social spending and past levels of social spending.
Defence spending was found to have been influenced largely by preVIOUS
expenditures on defence, increases in private expenditure, and non-defence spending.
Total non-defence spending was influenced largely by private expenditure and
defence spending. According to our results, defence spending increased about
simultaneously with the other functions i. e. there was no substitution between defence
spending and non-defence spending. This is shown by a positive and significant
coefficient of defence spending in the results. The private expenditure coefficient
show that as incomes increase so will the total non-defence spending.
The sizes of the estimated expenditure elasticities show that the increases in
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government spending were higher than the rate of growth of the economy, implying
that the government was borrowing to finance some of its expenditure. A significant
portion of the increase in current expenditure was attributed to the increases in wages
and salaries of public servants. The scope of the administrative functions of the
government increased overtime because of the political as well as the administrative
divisions that the country experienced during the period under review. The increases
in the government's wage bill came about partly as a result of the increase in the size
of the civil service, and partly as a result of the increase in the wage demands. There
was also an increase in the cost of servicing the public debt. The increase the public
debt was due to a combination of factors, including the large size of the debt stock,
fluctuations in the exchange rate, and increases in the interest rates. Loan fmancing
has been an important source of revenue to the government. The loans were used
initially to fund large scale public sector investment projects as well as the expansion
of the public corporations. But when the Revenue and Loan accounts were merged in
1981, borrowed funds were used to finance current expenditure, causing the debt
stock to increase.
The size and growth of the government expenditure call for a serious attention
to be paid to them. To decrease the expenditure, the government can start by freezing
public sector employment and wages as a short-term measure. Second, there could be
some auditing of all capital and current government expenditure, so that the
expenditures that are found to be inefficient are cut or restructured.
95
Defence spending has been one of the major contributors to the increases in
government expenditure. The government's increasing preoccupation to suppress
resistance to the apartheid system and the involvement of the country in the Angolan
war were the main reasons behind the increased expenditure. In the 1997/98 budget,
cuts were announced for the defence spending. This will go a long way towards
ensuring that spending by the defence force is contained.
On the economic services side, transfers to the state owned enterprises,
granting of subsidies and other incentives to the mining, agricultural, and
manufacturing sectors were largely to blame for the surge in economic expenditure.
The growth in government spending was positively related to the growth in
Income. During 1960-1969, when the growth in income was 6.4 %, all the
expenditure functions grew significantly. When the growth in income declined to
4.6% in 1970-1979, the growth in government spending was also positive but less
than the increase in the previous period. The same happened during the 1980-1989
period. In 1990-1993, the growth in income was negative and so was the growth in
government spending. This result supports the idea that increases in private income
leads to people substituting public for private goods and services. The public sector,
in satisfying the demand for public goods and services expands and so does its
expenditure. The substitution of private by public goods increases the demand for
public goods and services. The increased demand for public goods and services has
implications for how much the government will spend. Whenever the government is
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budgeting, it needs to take into cognisance the level of growth in incomes. The higher
the private incomes, the higher the demand for public goods and services. The
growth rate of 6% as envisaged in the government's Growth, Employment, and
Redistribution strategy (GEAR), coupled with the restructuring of the government
expenditures can lead to a better distribution of funds and a significant increase in the
resources available for social and economic services.
The study show that generally, the budgetary process for all the expenditure
functions was incremental during the review period. One disadvantage of the
incremental budget process is that money can be spent for the sake of spending to
justify a larger allocation the following financial year. The government therefore
needs to put in place a system of checks and balances, if it wants to continue with the
incremental budget system, to ensure that funds are not quickly and irresponsibly
spent towards the end of the financial year so that functions can argue for more funds
since they will have fInished their previous allocation. In the white paper on financial
management and expenditure budget reform, the department of finance proposes an
accrual basis of accounting and budgeting. For this system to work properly, proper
accounting procedures must be put in place. Furthermore, the government has to
develop and fmance the training of its personnel so that it has the necessary skills and
capacity to carry out the tasks as efficiently as possible. The medium term
expenditure framework will also ensure that provinces and national departments have
an idea of what their allocations will be in the next three years. The medium term
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expenditure framework will also help to eliminate the problem of budgeting for capital
expenditure which in some instances ends up creating roll-overs.
It is imperative to restructure the public sector. The process of rationalising
the government departments is already underway. What is required is for it to be
more focused and for targets to be set. The rationalisation must be aimed at reducing
the wages and salaries of the public servants. The important decision that the
government will confront in this regard is where to cut the public service, i.e. should
the cut affect the bottom or the top of the civil service. Either way there are trade-offs
to be incurred. For instance, cutting the wage bill by removing the big bunch at the
lower income level might not save the government much compared to what can be
saved if a few servants at the top are retrenched. However, in deciding who to
retrench, the skills of the workers and efficiency considerations need to be taken into
account. The public service needs to be made much more efficient and avoid
unnecessary bureaucracies. Efficiency can be ensured by having the right number of
civil servants who have the right skills and paid the market rate salaries. Hopefully
the duplication of activities will be eliminated with the merging of the various
departments, of the former republic, TBVC states and the self-governing territories.
Efficiency standards must also be set for the civil service and more of the ghosts
employees be removed from the civil service records. The government of national
unity appointed a Presidential Review Commission to look into how to restructure the
public service and how to make it to be more efficient. This was positive step.
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Unfortunately this commission experienced problems and was unable to operate.
There is a need to restructure the government spending priorities. Government
expenditure on housing, health care, education, and other forms of investment
spending is desirable than consumption spending. Government expenditure should
aim at creating a demand for new goods and services than increases in the public
sector pay. Spending on imported goods should be avoided whenever possible since it
weakens the balance of payments without necessarily stimulating domestic economic
activity. Expansion in government investment expenditure must not be done at the
expense of private investment as this may hamper economic growth and cause greater
unemployment. Excessive spending on security services must be guided against.
Overspending should be avoided as much as possible, and current spending
should only be financed from current revenue and capital spending from savings and
from borrowing. Private sources of funding must be mobilised. Duties that can be
performed better or services that can be provided by the private sector efficiently but
are currently being provided by the government should either be discontinued or be
transferred to the private sector. Those functions that are properly the responsibility
of the government must be carried out as efficiently and as cost-effectively as possible.
In the white paper on financial management and expenditure budget reform, the
department of finance proposes a process whereby the planning and budgeting
processes are linked. If this can be achieved, fiscal policy and budgeting will move in
the same direction towards attaining a common goal. In the past the planning and
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budgeting processes were not linked, as a result of that, the two were sometimes
conflicting and that is one of the reasons why the economy could not be controlled.
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APPENDIX 1: COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE,
1960 - 1993
in million rands As %of Gross Domestic Product
Year Nominal Real Nominal Real
1960 598.9 85.6 12.0 9.0
1961 651.9 91.8 12.1 9.2
1962 718.2 98.4 12.4 9.4
1963 804.3 109.0 13.0 10.0
1964 862.0 114.9 12.3 9.5
1965 1008.2 129.3 13.1 10.1
1966 1074.9 132.7 13.0 10.0
1967 1242.3 150.0 13.3 11.0
1968 1907.4 224.4 19.0 15.1
1969 1993.4 229.1 17.5 14.5
1970 2348.8 255.3 19.0 15.4
1971 2621.7 267.5 19.0 15.4
1972 3414.9 328.4 22.0 19.0
1973 4147.8 363.8 22.0 20.0
1974 4685.5 369.0 20.0 19.3
1975 5877.1 408.1 22.1 21.0
1976 7659.6 478.7 25.5 24.0
1977 8768.3 492.6 26.4 24.1
1978 9663.7 488.1 25.3 23.2
1979 10979.0 490.1 24.0 22.4
1980 12334.4 483.7 20.1 21.0
1981 15509.6 527.5 22.0 22.0
1982 17205.2 510.5 21.4 21.0
1983 21041.3 557.0 23.0 23.4
1984 24526.1 581.2 23.0 23.0
1985 28633.7 581.1 23.3 23.0
1986 34332.9 590.0 24.0 23.3
1987 41341.4 612.0 25.0 24.0
1988 59200.2 777.0 29.5 29.0
1989 74275.8 850.0 31.0 30.4
1990 98095.0 981.0 35.5 35.5
1991 92421.6 802.0 30.0 29.4
1992 110905.0 844.0 32.4 32.0
1993 133167.0 924.1 35.0 34.4
SOURCE: CENTRAL STATISTICAL SERVICES (VARIOUS ISSUES)
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APPENDIX 2: EXPENDITURE ON GENERAL ADMINISTRATION,
1960 - 1993
in million rands As %of Total Government As %of Gross Domestic Product
Expenditure
Year Nominal Real Nominal Real Nominal Real
1960 278.2 39.7 46.5 46.4 5.4 4.1
1961 311.8 43.9 48.0 48.0 6.0 4.4
1962 340.3 46.6 47.4 47.4 6.0 4.4
1963 359.6 48.6 45.0 45.0 6.0 4.3
1964 389.4 51.9 45.2 45.2 5.5 4.3
1965 435.7 55.9 43.2 43.2 6.0 4.4
1966 490.4 60.5 45.6 45.6 6.0 5.0
1967 560.0 67.5 45.1 45.0 6.0 5.0
1968 989.2 116.4 52.0 52.0 10.0 8.0
1969 1161.9 133.6 58.3 58.3 10.2 8.4
1970 1414.7 153.8 60.2 60.2 11.3 9.2
1971 1559.6 159.1 59.5 60.0 11.3 9.1
1972 2147.0 206.4 63.0 63.0 14.0 12.0
1973 2498.8 219.2 60.2 60.3 13.0 12.0
1974 2983.8 234.9 64.0 64.0 13.0 12.3
1975 3649.0 253.4 62.1 62.1 14.0 13.0
1976 4259.6 266.2 56.0 56.0 14.1 13.2
1977 4929.7 276.9 56.2 56.2 15.0 14.0
1978 5444.2 275.0 56.3 56.3 14.2 13.1
1979 6346.8 283.3 58.0 58.0 14.0 13.0
1980 7244.4 284.1 59.0 59.0 12.0 12.1
1981 7944.5 270.2 51.2 51.2 11.2 11.1
1982 10024.8 297.5 58.3 58.3 12.4 12.1
1983 11783.8 311.7 56.0 56.0 13.0 13.1
1984 14204.6 336.6 58.0 58.0 13.2 13.3
1985 17724.3 361.0 62.0 62.1 14.4 14.3
1986 20645.7 354.7 60.1 60.1 14.4 14.0
1987 25780.7 381.4 62.4 62.3 15.4 15.0
1988 31260.9 410.2 53.0 53.0 16.0 15.2
1989 38645.0 442.2 52.0 52.0 16.0 16.0
1990 19726.4 197.3 20.1 20.1 7.1 7.2
1991 48731.4 422.6 53.0 53.0 16.0 15.5
1992 36139.0 275.0 33.0 33.0 10.5 10.4
1993 42269.0 293.3 32.0 32.0 11.0 11.0
SOURCE: CENTRAL STATISTICAL SERVICES (VARIOUS ISSUES)
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APPENDIX 3: GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE ON ECONOMIC SERVICES,
1960 - 1993
in million rands As % of General Government As % of Gross Domestic Product
Expenditure
Year Nominal Real Nominal Real Nominal Real
1960 80.9 11.6 14.0 14.0 2.0 1.2
1961 83.7 11.8 13.0 13.0 1.5 1.2
1962 86.1 11.8 12.0 12.0 1.5 1.1
1963 97.1 13.1 12.1 12.0 1.5 1.2
1964 111.7 14.9 13.0 13.0 2.0 1.2
1965 122.4 16.0 12.1 12.4 2.0 1.2
1966 127.0 16.0 12.0 12.1 1.5 1.2
1967 152.6 18.4 12.3 12.3 2.0 1.3
1968 326.6 38.4 17.1 17.1 3.2 3.0
1969 330.9 38.0 17.0 17.0 3.0 2.4
1970 388.8 42.3 17.0 17.0 3.1 2.5
1971 464.9 47.4 18.0 18.0 3.4 3.0
1972 552.2 53.1 16.2 16.2 4.0 3.0
1973 733.6 64.4 18.0 18.0 4.0 3.5
1974 761.7 60.0 16.3 16.3 3.2 3.1
1975 1008.5 70.0 17.2 17.2 4.0 4.0
1976 1438.9 90.0 19.0 19.0 5.0 4.5
1977 1528.2 85.9 17.4 17.4 5.0 4.2
1978 1552.3 78.4 16.1 16.1 4.1 4.0
1979 1821.7 81.3 17.0 17.0 4.0 4.0
1980 1929.4 75.7 16.0 16.0 3.1 3.2
1981 2188.2 74.4 14.1 14.1 3.1 3.1
1982 2308.9 68.5 13.4 13.4 3.0 3.0
1983 2606.6 69.0 12.4 12.4 3.0 3.0
1984 3004.6 71.2 12.3 12.3 3.0 3.0
1985 3265.3 66.5 11.4 11.4 3.0 3.0
1986 3058.6 52.6 9.0 9.0 2.1 2.1
1987 3567.6 52.8 9.0 9.0 2.1 2.1
1988 6199.9 81.4 10.5 10.5 3.1 3.0
1989 6894.3 78.9 6.3 9.3 3.0 3.0
1990 13533.4 135.3 14.0 14.0 5.0 5.0
1991 7921.6 68.7 9.0 9.0 3.0 2.5
1992 14955.0 113.8 14.0 13.5 4.4 4.3
1993 22231.0 154.3 17.0 17.0 6.0 6.0
SOURCE: CENTRAL STATISTICAL SERVICES (VARIOUS ISSUES
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APPENDIX 4: GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE ON SOCIAL SERVICES,
1960 - 1993
in million rands As %of General Government As %of Gross Domestic Product
Expenditure
Year Nominal Real Nominal Real Nominal Real
1960 201.3 28.8 34.0 34.0 4.0 3.0
1961 210.6 30.0 32.3 33.0 4.0 3.0
1962 219.9 30.1 31.0 31.0 4.0 3.0
1963 222.9 30.1 28.0 28.0 3.5 3.0
1964 245.7 32.8 28.5 28.5 3.5 3.0
1965 260.8 33.4 26.0 26.0 3.4 3.0
1966 278.5 34.4 26.0 26.0 3.3 3.0
1967 317.5 38.2 26.0 25.5 3.4 3.0
1968 349.3 41.1 18.3 18.3 3.4 3.0
1969 255.0 29.3 13.0 13.0 2.2 2.0
1970 286.6 31.2 12.2 12.2 2.3 2.0
1971 331.6 33.8 13.0 13.0 2.4 2.0
1972 395.3 38.0 12.0 12.0 2.5 2.2
1973 413.1 36.2 10.0 10.0 2.1 2.0
1974 503.9 40.0 11.0 11.0 2.1 2.1
1975 621.0 43.1 10.6 11.0 2.3 2.2
1976 735.5 46.0 10.0 10.0 2.5 2.3
1977 847.4 47.6 10.0 10.0 2.5 2.3
1978 954.6 48.2 10.0 10.0 2.5 2.3
1979 1076.8 48.1 10.0 10.0 2.4 2.2
1980 1277.2 50.1 10.4 10.4 2.1 2.1
1981 1583.2 54 10.2 10.2 2.2 2.2
1982 2000.5 59.4 12.0 12.0 2.5 2.4
1983 2413.2 63.8 11.5 11.5 3.0 3.0
1984 2798.8 66.3 11.4 11.4 3.0 3.0
1985 3422.2 70.0 12.0 12.0 3.0 3.0
1986 5173.9 89.0 15.1 15.1 4.0 3.5
1987 6247.7 92.4 15.1 15.1 4.0 4.0
1988 12223.5 160.4 21.0 21.0 6.1 6.0
1989 14395.0 164.7 19.4 19.4 3.0 6.0
1990 40472.1 404.7 41.3 41.3 15.0 15.0
1991 21133.6 183.3 23.0 23.0 7.0 7.0
1992 48412.0 368.4 44.0 44.0 14.1 14.0
1993 57938.0 402.1 43.5 43.5 15.1 15.0
SOURCE: CENTRAL STATISTICAL SERVICES (VARIOUS ISSUES)
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APPENDIX 5: GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE ON DEFENCE,1960 - 1993
in million rands As %of General Government As %of Gross Domestic Product
Expenditure
Year Nominal Real Nominal Real Nominal Real
1960 38.6 5.5 6.4 6.4 1.0 1.0
1961 45.8 6.5 7.0 7.1 1.0 1.0
1962 71.9 9.8 10.0 10.0 1.2 1.0
1963 124.7 17.0 15.5 16.0 2.0 1.5
1964 115.3 15.4 13.4 13.4 2.0 1.3
1965 189.2 24.3 19.0 19.0 2.5 2.0
1966 179.0 22.1 17.0 17.0 2.1 2.0
1967 212.1 26.0 17.1 17.3 2.3 2.0
1968 242.2 28.5 13.0 13.0 2.4 2.0
1969 236.9 27.2 12.0 12.0 2.1 2.0
1970 258.4 28.1 11.0 11.0 2.1 2.0
1971 258.9 26.4 10.0 10.0 2.0 1.5
1972 320.3 31.0 9.4 9.4 2.1 2.0
1973 344.2 30.2 8.3 8.3 2.0 2.0
1974 425.3 33.5 9.1 9.1 2.0 2.0
1975 696.9 48.4 12.0 12.0 3.0 2.5
1976 1087.2 68.0 14.2 14.2 4.0 3.4
1977 1384.4 78.0 16.0 16.0 4.2 4.0
1978 1605.7 81.1 17.0 17.0 4.2 4.0
1979 1669.5 74.5 15.2 15.2 4.0 3.4
1980 2133.9 84.0 17.3 17.4 3.5 4.0
1981 2514.1 86.0 16.2 16.3 3.5 3.5
1982 2871.5 85.2 17.0 17.0 4.0 3.5
1983 3194.9 84.5 15.2 15.2 3.5 3.5
1984 3385.5 80.2 14.0 14.0 3.2 3.2
1985 3997.8 81.4 14.0 14.0 3.2 3.2
1986 4475.0 77.0 13.0 13.1 3.1 3.0
1987 5724.1 85.0 14.0 14.0 3.4 3.3
1988 9264.8 122.0 16.0 16.0 5.0 4.5
1989 11163.6 127.7 15.0 15.0 5.0 5.0
1990 10852.2 108.5 11.1 11.1 4.0 4.0
1991 10236.2 89.0 11.1 11.1 3.3 3.3
1992 11399.0 87.0 10.3 10.3 3.3 3.3
1993 10729.0 74.5 8.1 8.1 3.0 3.0
SOURCE: CENTRAL STATISTICAL SERVICES (VARIOUS ISSUES)
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APPENDIX 6: ECONOMIC COMPOSITION OF GENERAL GOVERNMENT
EXPENDITURE, 1960 - 1993.
AS % OF GENERAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE AS % OF GROSS DOMESTIC
PRODUCT
Year Goods Interes Other* Current Capital Current Capital
And t Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure
Services Payment
1960/61 56.0 4.2 17.0 77.2 22.8 12.8 3.8
1961/62 56.0 4.7 18.0 78.2 21. 2 13.4 3.6
1962/63 59.0 4.4 16.0 79.2 20.8 14.1 3.7
1963/64 59.0 4.2 13.0 75.4 24.6 13.5 4.4
1964/65 55.0 3.6 14.0 72.4 27.6 14.4 5.5
1965/66 56.0 4.3 11. 0 70.8 29.2 14.1 5.8
1966/67 55.0 4.4 12.0 71. 3 28.7 15.0 6.0
1967/68 50.0 4.7 15.0 69.4 30.6 15.2 6.7
1968/69 49.0 5.5 9.0 63.7 36.3 14.3 8.2
1969/70 53.0 7.5 10.0 70.9 29.1 15.0 6.2
1970/71 58.0 6.8 9.0 73.3 26.7 15.4 5.6
1971/72 53.0 5.7 15.0 74.3 25.7 18.5 6.4
1972/73 53.0 6.8 16.0 75.8 24.2 17.9 5.7
1973/74 47.0 6.2 11. 0 63.6 36.4 15.7 9.0
1974/75 50.0 6.5 11. 0 67.2 32.8 15.2 7.4
1975/76 50.0 5.6 11. 0 65.8 34.2 17.4 9.0
1976/77 51. 0 5.7 11. 0 67.7 32.3 19.3 9.2
1977/78 51. 0 6.0 12.0 68.6 31. 4 20.8 9.5
1978/79 49.0 6.8 14.0 70.4 29.6 21. 4 9.0
1979/80 49.0 11. 8 8.0 68.4 31. 6 19.2 8.9
1980/81 52.0 10.7 10.0 72.5 27.5 17.5 6.6
1981/82 51. 0 9.7 9.0 69.4 30.6 18.0 8.0
1982/83 52.0 13.2 7.0 72.7 27.3 19.8 7.4
1983/84 55.0 13.1 9.0 77.4 22.6 21. 9 6.4
1984/85 55.0 14.7 9.0 79.5 20.5 22.0 5.7
1985/86 57.0 15.4 20.0 92.4 7.6 26.6 2.2
1986/87 58.0 14.0 19.0 90.8 9.2 26.7 2.7
1987/88 60.0 12.8 19.0 91. 4 8.6 27.5 2.6
1988/89 58.0 13.4 18.0 89.8 10.2 27.3 3.1
1989/90 56.0 15.1 15.0 86.4 13.6 27.4 4.3
1990/91 62.0 13.9 18.0 94.4 5.6 27.8 1.7
1991/92 63.0 15.2 16.0 94.3 5.7 28.5 1.7
1992/93 61. 0 15.2 15.0 91. 6 8.4 31. 0 2.8
1993/94 57.0 16.2 15.0 88.9 11.1 31. 8 4.0
SOURCE: 1. Publlc Flnance Statlstlcs of South Afrlca,
1946 - 1993
2. South Africa's National Income Accounts, 1946 -
1993
3. SARB Quarterly Bulletin (various issues)
4. Government of South Africa, Budget Review
(various issues)
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